This study focuses on the views of Feofan Prokopovich, a unique Orthodox thinker whose world outlook was shaped by the obvious influence of the ideas of the Protestant and Catholic Enlightenment. Talking about the Enlightenment, modern historiography focuses on the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon, preferring to talk about the Enlightenment, including the religious or confessional Enlightenment, aimed at rethinking the role of religion and the church. The Religious Enlightenment was a pan-European phenomenon that embraced Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, and Orthodoxy, and grew out of the desire to create an intelligent religion free of superstition and serving society. The intellectual movement of the religious Enlightenment sought to reconcile the natural philosophy of the 17th–18th centuries with a religious view of the world, while at the same time trying to overcome the extremes of religious fanaticism, on the one hand, and nihilism and godlessness, on the other. The process of forming a new intellectual environment is marked by the coexistence and mutual influence of a variety of (sometimes poorly compatible) traditions, their transformation and modification. Comprehensively arguing the need for unlimited autocracy in Russia, Feofan Prokopovich, nevertheless, actively used the discourse of the Enlightenment in his writings, discussing the problem of the origin of the state, the mode of government, the boundaries of the power of the monarch, the rights and duties of subjects. Using the example of Feofan Prokopovich, we can talk about the emergence and rooting of intellectual practices of a new type in Russian everyday life. The integration of Western European ideas and practices into Russian culture was ambiguous, multifaceted and depended on their adaptation to the socio-political space of Russia. Being well acquainted with the works of European authors of the 17th and early 18th centuries, he rather took on the formal side of their discussions on socio-political topics, and adapted a conceptual glossary that was new for the Russian educated public, which opened up opportunities for talking about politics in a new way.

This article develops a novel temporal approach to the sustainability of nuclear anarchy. The existing literature offers two opposite perspectives on the topic: some scholars argue that nuclear anarchy is unsustainable, since it will inevitably either lead to a catastrophic nuclear war or evolve into a hierarchical world order. Their opponents doubt the inevitability of nuclear war in a system of sovereign states and/or its catastrophic nature. However, the debate, as it stands now, ignores the fact that both technology and social structures are embedded in – and mediated by – cultures and worldviews. In particular, both nuclear weapons and inter-state anarchy are embedded in specific temporalities.

Taking this embeddedness into account, we identify and compare perceptions of time that are interrelated with nuclear weapons, on one hand, and international anarchy, on the other. The article reveals a temporal contradiction of nuclear anarchy: while nuclear weapons imply a potential finitude of humanity, the system of sovereign states is intrinsically connected with an indefinite temporality. We derive two theoretical implications from the concept of temporal contradiction. First, the realization of finite temporality will subvert the legitimacy of an anarchic world order and encourage limitations on national sovereignty. Second, international anarchy will “eternalize” nuclear weapons, i.e., reinterpret them as compatible with the eternity of human civilization. Familiar events in nuclear history, including early attempts to establish international control of nuclear energy, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the evolution of the anti-nuclear movement are interpreted here as empirical evidence in favour of the theoretical implications described above.

Thus, the concept of temporal contradiction provides another argument for the idea that nuclear anarchy is unsustainable in the long run, since the proliferation of the finite temporality leads to international hierarchy, whereas persistent indefinite temporality masks the severity of the nuclear threat, making nuclear war more conceivable and probable.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has become known for its active engagement in the drafting and promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). ICAN’s success is related to the fact that it counts other anti-nuclear non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a number of state figures and diplomats among its members. ICAN is a “transnational advocacy network” (TAN) that has managed to engage a significant pool of state and non-state stakeholders (actors). This paper aims to explore the ICAN phenomenon and identify the features of this transnational advocacy network. The study is based on documents and materials drawn from the official ICAN website, working papers from the NPT Review Conferences, and interviews with representatives of anti-nuclear NGOs. The novelty of the study consists in the fact that a new interpretation of the concept of “transnational advocacy network” was introduced into Russian academic discourse and the main instruments and principles of TAN were identified on the basis of the ICAN example. The research into ICAN was carried out according to three bullet-points: (1) analysis of NGO activities in the NPT negotiation process; (2) identification of the features of ICAN as a TAN, the main trends and methods of work; (3) problems and limitations of ICAN. A hallmark of TANs today is that they combine advocacy and expert assessment, allowing such coalitions to work successfully with international organizations and states. ICAN is an interesting case study because there has been a convergence of interests between a number of states and anti-nuclear NGOs. However, the question remains as to how long it will be able to keep functioning in the TAN format and continue to frame the agenda of the NPT Conferences. The drive to ban nuclear weapons, and then to lobby for the signing and ratification of the NPT, demonstrated that ICAN had moved from public activity to direct diplomacy. However, there is reason to believe ICAN and its coordinating role in the NPT negotiation process may become less important as the focus and interests of states shifts back to public outreach activities.

The present article analyzes the consequences of the coming into force of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which forbids use of nuclear weapons and their deployment on the territories of states that ratified it. The article is based on the main international treaties that regulate the status of nuclear weapons – the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.

The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons divided states into two groups – States Participants to the Treaty and states that are not party to it. According to the Treaty, the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited in the territory of States Participants and must be considered a war crime. The use of nuclear weapons prohibited in the territory of states that are not party to the Treaty is subject to the same regime as before. The International Court of Justice considered this regime in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons of 1996. The present article analyses this Advisory Opinion.

The author comes to the conclusion that the legal foundations upon which the Advisory Opinion is based remain in force, including its central provision that there it is not forbidden for a state to use nuclear weapons when its survival is at stake. This situation may occur when a state enters into an armed conflict with another state or group of states (allied by their membership in a military-political organization) with superior military and economic potential. The use of nuclear weapons is not forbidden against all members of this military-political organization.

This article examines the globalization – in its Americanization format – of international cinematic communication within the perspective of cultural diversity. The globalization process is comprehended as a result of the historical succession of market formations: from free competition in American cinema to an oligopoly and on to a national and an international monopoly. During the period of polypoly, the trail for globalization was blazed by the grande dame of the cinématographe: France. The United States, where in 1908 French films accounted for 70% of the market share, mounted a resolute challenge. We look at three factors – institutional, geopolitical, and creative – that explain why the French lost their domination over the American and, then, their own market. The French state responded to the soft power of American cinema by introducing quotas for national films. The industry was motivated by the need to protect the state both within its borders and beyond, and the preserve national customs and traditions. A number of other countries also resorted to the use of quotas as a means of mitigating the soft power of the United States: larger countries did so for economic considerations, while smaller countries did it for cultural reasons. The globalizational might of the American film industry is explained through the rational choice of the main line for its stylistic development and the filmmakers’ mastery of their craft, as well as through the professional skills of industry executives and marketing divisions, investment from big capital, and through support from the government in its push for the “cultural hegemony” of the United States. The major studios that emerged during the period of oligopoly (1909–1929) competed with one another on the terms of a certain accord. Their method of dealing with competition was to invest obscene amounts in movie production, far beyond the capabilities of smaller studios, which enabled them to establish a national monopoly over the domestic market (1930–1946). On the world market, the chosen method of competition enabled the American film industry, in the second half of the 1940s, to gain the position of international monopolist. An important role in the process was played by Motion Picture Export Association, established in 1945, as a sort of “diplomatic service” that functioned with permission from and under the support of the U.S. government. From its position as the global monopolist, the American film industry strives not only to dominate intercultural cinematic communication, but also, in this status and as a means of popular geopolitics, to control it through lobbying and exporting capital and goods. The transborder circulation of products by various national cinemas and the cultural diversity of cinematography have largely fallen prey to the globalization process. Extensive research has demonstrated an imbalance in in tercultural film communication. When, in a social-functional respect, the importing of films mainly supplants their production in a certain country, the population is largely deprived of the chance to reproduce its culture and, accordingly, its identity with the means of depicting and mastering its own image. The making of a national cinematic picture of the world and its integration into the communicative process becomes a pressing issue in the provision of cultural diversity.

The article focuses on political cartoons about Russia and analyses the potential of multimodal media texts as tools of popular geopolitics. The author also employs Stuart Hall’s concept of propaganda, considering the text of a caricature from the semiotic perspective. The integration of the theoretical fields of popular geopolitics and propaganda is substantiated, since not only do political cartoons form stereotypes about politics and international relations among media readers, but they also perform propaganda functions, conveying the point of view of the information platform on Russian politics and Russia. The empirical base of the study includes 242 political cartoons from Russian- and English-language foreign media, posted in the public domain on the internet in 2020–2021, the period of the COVID-19 pandemic. Political cartoons are analysed through expert evaluation and the use of interdisciplinary classifiers. The obtained empirical results were subjected to statistical processing, including the identification of correlations. The results demonstrate that foreign media political cartoons about Russia and Russian politics create two different images of Russia. The first description is typical for English cartoons where Russia appears in the context of international relations, mostly its ties with the United States; and the target character in English cartoon is the Russian president. English-language cartoons are more often focused on harsh criticism and the use of schematized images. Moderate criticism dominates in Russian-language cartoons published by foreign media; the target characters are not only the president, but also other representatives of Russian society. Thematically, Russian-language cartoons are constructed in the context of Russia’s domestic political problems; the field of education is usually the most intentionally “negative.” According to the study, Russian-language cartoons of foreign media demonstrate the most complex and rich visual code and use Aesopian language. In conclusion, the author highlights the importance of further studies of the tools of popular geopolitics, as well as the need to improve the practice of creating multimodal media texts in the logic of the Russian understanding of geopolitics.