In the post-pandemic years of 2021–2022, the post-Soviet space has entered a stage of decisive transformation, which will test the maturity of the state institutions formed 30 years ago for the region’s countries. The study captures a snapshot of public sentiment in these countries on the eve of this wave of transformation – it is based on a series of large-scale opinion polls carried out in Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan, conducted immediately after the most recent elections to the lower houses of parliaments of these countries in the pre-crisis era. The main research question of the sociological study was to identify demographic and geographical patterns in determining the attitude of voters toward the prospects for relations with Russia. Countries with traditionally different strategies of relations with Russia were taken: Belarus is a strategic ally, Kazakhstan is friendly but pursues a multi-vector policy, and Georgia is generally hostile at the level of the political class. The analysis showed that in matters of orientation towards positive relations with Russia, the voters of these countries nevertheless had more in common than they had differences. Based on the results of our analysis, several lines of delimitation can be distinguished. Firstly, the “macro-regional, geopolitical” line runs between Belarus and Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and Georgia, on the other. The second split along the “centre-periphery” line takes place within states. Such a demarcation was singled out by many researchers in relation to Russia; however, we found the same demarcations in Belarus (“Minsk and the rest of the country”), and partly in Georgia and Kazakhstan. Finally, the authors acknowledge possible delimitations along the north–south lines in Georgia (Shestakova 2021: 156); to a certain extent along the north–centre–south line in Kazakhstan (Vinogradov 2020: 177), as a result of territorial differentiation, with Russians living in the northern regions of the country and people are more positively disposed to Russia than those living in the more remote southern regions; and somewhat in Belarus – in those regions that border Russia and Ukraine

This paper is aimed at investigating the influence of political foundations on the domestic and foreign policies of state and analyzing the place and role of foundations in international relations. The relevance of this topic lies in the expanded use of semi-official and guerilla diplomacy instruments in the foreign policy toolkits of governments, which are widely financed by political foundations. The paper deals with the development of the contemporary political foundations of the United States and Germany, including a comparative analysis of performance features. We introduce a classification of the functions of foundations in the context of international relations. The conclusion is drawn that German political foundations are designed much like a ministry of foreign affairs with the elements of a political party, whereas the typical American philanthropic foundation is run much like a business corporation. German representatives tend to be present on the spot, continuously make contacts and keep track of local developments. Meanwhile, American foundations apply a project-based approach, and aim to create NGOs or partnerships geared towards concrete actions or tasks making claims for international legitimacy. Foundations in Germany and the United States are different in terms of funding models, degree of governmental involvement, scale and methods. Both serve as proxies and commentators of the ideology of the ruling elites, which contributes to the foreign policy aims of their countries of origin. By distancing themselves from official diplomacy and formal legal autonomy (although the programmes of the largest foundations are often consistent with the interests of their home country), foundations have plenty of room for manoeuvre and are thus able to penetrate the society of the target country and influence sensitive areas, such as education, domestic policies, the expert community, the media, etc. A great deal of ties and points of influence on social and power structures of a foreign country are thus shaped “from the inside,” and could be exploited to further the interests of the state of origin of a given foundations. The experience of Western foundations is actively employed by other, including non-Western, states and organizations. A range of tools could be applied to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian integration project of Russia according to the principles of mutuality and inclusivity.

The historiography of the famine in Soviet Russia and Ukraine 1921–1923 includes a large number of academic papers covering foreign humanitarian aid to the starving population in the context of the work of such large organizations as the American Relief Administration, the Nansen Committee, etc. At the same time, there are practically no articles or theses that fully describe the assistance to the starving people in the Soviet Union from individual states and national aid committees. The purpose of this article is to highlight and summarize the main aspects of the activities of the Dutch charitable and public organizations on the territory of Soviet Russia and Ukraine during the famine of 1921–1923 on the basis of documents from the Russian central and regional archives, as well as the National Archives of Sweden, data from which we are introducing into scientific circulation for the first time. Despite the absence of diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and the Netherlands, representatives of almost all sectors of Dutch society took part in these activities. The data we have collected allows us to identify four main channels through which humanitarian aid from the Netherlands was received in the areas affected by crop failure: 1) Pro-government and charitable public organizations (the Netherlands Red Cross, the Dutch branch of Save the Children International), which provided aid to the population in Volga Region, Crimea and in Ukraine. In addition to sending humanitarian supplies, the Netherlands Red Cross sent its own mission to Samara province; 2) Associations of trade unions of the Second International, which participated in the financing of an independent mission of the International Federation of Trade Unions to Chuvash Autonomous Oblast; 3) communist trade unions and associations of the Netherlands, acting through the Workers International Relief organization, which took part in the restoration of the Soviet national economy, and also maintained numerous orphanages in Soviet Russia; 4) Religious societies of Dutch Mennonite Protestants, which sent humanitarian aid to the places of settlement of people who shared their religious beliefs, where, at the insistence of the Soviet government, they provided aid to all those in need, regardless of religion. All the activities of various Dutch organizations and individual citizens in Soviet Russia and the Ukraine showed the readiness of the population and political forces of the Netherlands to maintain close contacts and interaction between the peoples of the two countries, regardless of the official relations of states and political differences.

The international legal content of the concept of sustainable development, so common in international treaties and sometimes expressed in different terms, undoubtedly requires clarification today, as does its place in the system of international law.
Firstly, it is interesting to answer the question of how ideas of sustainable development have resulted in their crystallization as a concept of international law. Secondly, using treaty sources of the international law of the sea, where this notion is particularly common, it is meaningful to identify the intentions of states parties to such treaties to consider sustainable development clauses as legal obligations. Thirdly, it is important to determine whether these clauses now constitute a principle of the international law of the sea or whether they retain the status of separate treaty obligations that are not interrelated.
The article is based on an analysis primarily of the norms of the international law of the sea, in which the term “sustainable development” is applied, with reference to the scientific and legal literature and judicial decisions relevant to the topic. The research involves methods of legal construction, legal modelling, analysis and synthesis, systematic, structural-functional, formal-logical, formal-legal, historical and chronological methods.
The analysis of international treaties and other international legal instruments relating to this issue has shown that the long-standing ideas of “sustainable development” are now normatively well-established; that the provisions of international treaties on sustainable development have already developed as an inter-branch (cross-cutting) principle of international law at the intersection, primarily, of the international law of the sea and international environmental law; and that in practice states undertake explicit obligations and exercise relevant rights in the framework of upholding this crosscutting principle.
The authors’ vision of the content of this principle is offered and its various manifestations in the international law of the sea are shown. The study critically evaluates the prevailing view in the Western international legal literature that the idea of sustainable development was first suggested by the 1987 Report “Our Common Future” (the Brundtland Report). It is shown that the idea predates this report, and that the initial mechanisms for sustainable development had already been reflected in existing international treaties by 1987. The suggestion is made that the international legal concept of sustainable development has several cumulative components that together define its content. Among these there are elements that are part of this concept primarily because they are means of achieving sustainable development goals, having a much narrower scope if interpreted in isolation. The international legal principle of sustainable development seeks to resolve the tensions primarily between the right of states to development and their duty to protect the environment, serving as a nexus that ensures that neither the one nor the other is neglected. Its social dimension is undoubtedly significant, although it has been interpreted very differently in the international legal literature.
In the context of contemporary international law, it would be wise to assert an interbranch (cross-cutting) nature of the sustainable development principle: its legal content extends beyond the scope of specific branches of international law, including international law of the sea, international environmental and economic law. However, most international treaties of a universal and especially regional character that contain some form of sustainable development clauses currently refer to sources of the international law of the sea, which may certainly change in the future.

This article presents an analysis, based on the study of international law and doctrine and practice of states, the content of the institution of the historic rights of states to the sea areas, its correlation with the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the legal status of the Sea of Okhotsk and the possibility of its adjustment in the context of a possible statement by Russia that it has historic rights to this water area.
The issues raised in the article are structurally divided into three main groups. The first is related to the study of the reasons for the emergence of the institution of the historic rights of states to maritime areas in the international law of the sea, as well as its correlation with the legal mechanisms for the delimitation and use of maritime spaces defined by the 1982 UN Convention. The second group is devoted to studying the structure of this institution and the definition of the concept and content within its framework of such key notions and categories as “historic bays,” “historic waters,” “historic legal foundations,” “historic title of the state,” and others. The third group is directly connected with the definition of the fundamental possibility and potential scope of the Russian Federation extending its historic rights to the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk. The authors proceeded from the fact that despite the incredibly limited room for manoeuvre for Russia in terms of defending its historic title to the Sea of Okhotsk, the situation is not entirely hopeless in the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, we should bear in mind that the key to success in the resolution of this issue lies not in declaring the Sea of Okhotsk an inland sea of Russia or its historic waters, but rather in legitimizing many of its exclusive historic rights in this sea area based on Russia’s vital interests.
The content of the institution of the historic rights of states to maritime spaces, as well as the new political reality, give the Government and the State Duma of the Russian Federation the necessary legal grounds to broach the issue of a partial change in the country’s stance on the legal status of the Sea of Okhotsk and the development of a new strategy for asserting Russia’s historic rights to its water area, both through the adoption of unilateral legal acts, and through the implementation of a consistent policy to disseminate and defend this point of view in international relations within the framework of negotiations with foreign states and the activities of relevant international bodies and organizations.

At various times, the sustainable use of living marine resources in the high seas outside exclusive economic zones, as well as in areas under the jurisdiction of Arctic coastal states, has been severely damaged by illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. As the climate warms, the threat of unregulated fishing has also emerged on the high seas in the central Arctic Ocean. The Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean was signed in Ilullissat (Greenland, Denmark) on October 3, 2018 following multi-round negotiations in the so-called “five plus five” format – representatives of five Arctic states plus representatives of four non-Arctic states and the European Union. This new international legal document reflects national interests in the optimal use of living marine resources of the Arctic states, the Arctic indigenous peoples and residents, as well as interested states.
The present article shows the evolution of international legal instruments to prevent illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing in the high seas. Particular attention is paid to the study of normative and doctrinal materials revealing the treaty practice of states in the Arctic enclaves. A legal interpretation of the provisions of the 2018 Agreement is also given. In the study, the authors used historical, comparative-legal and other general scientific and special legal methods.
From an international perspective, the 2018 Agreement is an innovative legal document that reflects the interests of Arctic and non-Arctic states alike. Despite concerns about the participation of the latter (China, in particular) on the part of Western countries, the Agreement was nevertheless signed and ratified before possible commercial fishing on the high seas in the Central Arctic Ocean starts. This would prevent illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing in advance and thus prevent the depletion of living marine resources in this part of the Arctic Ocean, unlike what happened in other enclaves of the high seas in the Northern Hemisphere.
The entry into force of the 2018 Agreement marked the beginning of cooperation among interested states in the prevention of unregulated high seas fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. In addition to the general purpose of the Agreement, scientific cooperation between the Parties will contribute to a better understanding of the leastexplored area of the high seas. It is likely that environmental cooperation in the Central Arctic Ocean will expand considerably in the future.