This article uses documentary sources from Russian, American, and British archives to analyse the intricacies of coalition diplomacy among the Allies during the Second World War. Particular emphasis is placed on investigating the extent to which each side observed their obligations and the general rules of conduct, which include respect for the interests of the other parties, maintaining unity in the face of disagreements, coordinating actions towards shared objectives, and avoiding movements that could cause the coalition to breakdown. Our comparative analysis of Soviet and AngloAmerican diplomacy reveals that the principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition generally adhered to these rules, and this contributed significantly to the ultimate defeat of their common adversary. However, the study indicates that the Soviet Union exhibited greater fidelity in fulfilling its obligations and was more proactive in institutionalizing the coalition in order to increase stability and ensure equal participation in strategic decision-making on conducting the war conduct and post-war settlement. This quest for parity was often impeded by the reluctance of the Western powers to accept the Soviet Union as an enduring, equal partner and legitimate member of the great powers’ club, both during and after the war. This hesitance, the article argues, was rooted not only in geopolitical considerations, but also in deep-seated cultural factors, particularly the traditional Western sense of superiority and perception of Russia as a “lesser” civilization not fit for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community. The article brings to light lesser-known documents from U.S. and UK archives to illustrate this mindset. It also acknowledges dissenting voices in Anglo-American political spheres that advocated for a more equitable relationship with the USSR. However, these perspectives did not significantly alter the overarching direction of Western policy.

This article aims to identify the conceptual landscape occupied by ideas of post-war multipolarity within the strategic discourse of Soviet diplomacy during the latter phases of the Second World War. Particular emphasis is placed on the intellectual contributions of two prominent Soviet diplomats, Maxim Litvinov and Ivan Maisky. In the paper, the author draws upon both published and archival source materials including the diaries and records maintained by officials within the Soviet Foreign Office, as well as documents produced by the “Litvinov Commission.”

While the diplomatic theories formulated by Litvinov and Maisky during the years 1943–1945 have been subject to analysis by Russian and international scholars, existing scholarship has for the most part focused on the content and nuances of their perspectives on specific international “questions.” Departing from this convention, this article adopts a methodological approach that seeks to explore the underlying conceptual foundations upon which the ideas of Litvinov and Maisky were constructed. Additionally, the essay introduces a novel dimension by surveying the viewpoints of other Soviet diplomats (Solomon Lozovsky, Boris Shtein, Yakov Surits, and Yevgeny Tarle), who have garnered relatively less scholarly attention.

The author pays special attention to the nature of Litvinov and Maisky’s conceptualization of the international landscape following the war as a multipolar system, although the term “multipolarity” is not explicitly used. The article addresses such issues as how the Soviet diplomats envisioned the post-war security architecture, whether they considered Soviet-American bipolarity inevitable, and what factors and circumstances influenced their foreign policy conceptualizations. The resurgence today of discussions surrounding the trajectory of multipolarity in the 21stcentury underscores the pertinence of this historical inquiry.

The key conclusion of the article is that the conceptual framework embraced by Soviet diplomats in 1943–1945 was not centred on notions of bipolarity or an imminent Cold War. While acknowledging the potential escalation of tensions between the USSR and Western nations led by the United States and Great Britain, they favoured collaboration among the principal powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, grounded in an implicit understanding of their respective “spheres of influence.” Although Soviet Foreign Office officials did not discount the possibility of the formation of a united Anglo-American front against the USSR, they believed that Soviet diplomacy should actively work to prevent such an outcome by capitalizing on the fissures between Washington and London.

In early 1941, Moscow learned through its intelligence channels and diplomatic efforts about the growing rapprochement between Berlin and Helsinki that consisted of increased German–Finnish military collaboration, the deployment of German troops and military equipment in Finland, the recruitment of Finnish volunteers for SS units in Germany, the construction of fortifications along the Soviet border, and the massing of Finnish forces near the Soviet border. Despite initially maintaining neutrality after Germany’s invasion of the USSR, Finland declared war on the Soviet Union on June 26, 1941. The Finnish side got the better of the Soviet Union during the early phase of operations on the Soviet–Finnish front from July to December 1941. This was followed by a “positional war” that continued from late December 1941 until summer 1944, with little change to the front line. During this period, Stockholm emerged as a key geopolitical hub where Soviet diplomats, led by Alexandra Kollontai, and intelligence officers navigated the complex task of encouraging Finland to engage in peace talks with the Soviet Union and withdraw from the war. Sweden’s neutrality in the conflict and its traditionally strong ties with Finland positioned it as an effective mediator in these negotiations. Additionally, Moscow successfully lobbied Washington to exert diplomatic pressure on Helsinki to initiate negotiations, which gradually began to yield positive results. The multifaceted efforts of Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers, coupled with Kollontai’s active involvement in this diplomatic endeavour, led to two rounds of Soviet–Finnish negotiations in Moscow in March and September 1944. While the March talks faltered due to the positions taken by the Finnish delegates and politicians, the September negotiations succeeded in persuading Finland to agree to a truce and cease hostilities. This diplomatic victory contributed to the gradual disintegration of the anti-USSR coalition led by Germany, with Finland becoming a crucial component to exit this alliance.

The history of Soviet–Hungarian interactions from the establishment of diplomatic relations until Hungary entered the Second World War alongside the Axis powers offers valuable insights into the dynamics between small and great powers, as well as the efforts of small European states, particularly Hungary, to navigate their national interests in foreign policy in the face of the encroachments of Nazi Germany. This period was defined by two primary factors: the Hungarian political elite, led by Miklós Horthy, sought to join a quasi-crusade against Comintern Soviet Russia, while simultaneously striving to avoid deep involvement in major conflicts between the great powers. This dual approach aligned with the policies of Hitler’s Western appeasers, who aimed to redirect German expansion eastward. In this geopolitical scenario, American and Western European actors (including Great Britain and France) were relegated to the role of observers, anticipating a prolonged conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that would drain both. The Hungarian leadership hoped to secure a position among these observers and thus avoid direct participation in the conflict, and to later engage in territorial reconfiguration after the war. However, the reality in Europe by the early 1940s was very different, with Western powers (the United States and Great Britain) unable to redirect Hitler’s global domination ambitions eastward. Facing an existential threat, these powers were compelled to enter the war. It was against this backdrop that Soviet diplomacy endeavoured to deter Hungary’s alliance with Nazi Germany. Although ultimately unsuccessful, examining these diplomatic efforts offers valuable lessons in the context of the current evolution towards a multipolar world.

This article offers an in-depth analysis of Soviet policy and diplomacy in the Far East during the tumultuous period spanning from the 1920s to the 1940s. These policies were profoundly shaped by two key factors: first, the ideological considerations rooted in the political framework established in the USSR following the 1917 Revolution, and second, the geopolitical dynamics reflecting the evolving global and regional political landscape in the Far East. The ruling Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government faced formidable challenges as they sought to safeguard the nascent Soviet Republic amid mounting international tensions, both globally and within the AsiaPacific region.

This study aims to present a comprehensive and integrated examination of Soviet policy and diplomacy during this era, which can be split into four distinct time periods, each with its unique features, priorities, and challenges. At the same time, these periods are united by the overarching goal of consolidating the Soviet Union’s position in the Far Eastern region and the broader Pacific theatre. The four discernible stages in Soviet policy and diplomacy in the Far East encompass:

1. The period spanning from 1927 to 1932, which was marked by an initial deterioration in relations between the Soviet government and the Kuomintang administration following the 1927 split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CPC). This phase also witnessed the 1929 conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway and culminated in the reestablishment of Sino–Soviet relations, all set against the backdrop of escalating Japanese aggression in Northeastern China (Manchuria). This phase demanded adroit diplomacy that balanced strength and strategic statecraft.
2. The 1930s, which, especially in the aftermath of Japan’s aggressive incursions into China, saw limited interaction and collaboration between the USSR and the Republic of China. This period featured cautious Soviet–Japanese interaction and included significant events such as armed clashes at Lake Khasan and the KhalkhinGol River, as well as the signing of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact.
3. The era of the Great Patriotic War from 1941 to 1945, during which the Soviet Union’s foremost objective was the defeat of the German Nazi aggressor. During this period, Soviet diplomacy was primarily focused on relations with its Anglo-American allies, with particular emphasis on the contentious issue of opening a second front. Consequently, Far Eastern and Pacific policy concerns assumed a somewhat marginalized role within the realm of Soviet diplomacy.
4. Finally, the period spanning from the winter to the summer of 1945. During this time, the Soviet Union intensified its political, diplomatic, and military involvement in the Far East, all against the backdrop of preparations to enter the war against Japan. Diplomatic endeavours reached their zenith during this critical phase.

This editorial introduces a series of papers based on presentations made at the “Soviet Diplomacy during World War II” conference held at MGIMO on June 30, 2023. It draws attention to notable aspects of Soviet diplomacy during the wartime period. First, it highlights the persistence of Soviet diplomats and their negotiating skills despite significant divergences in interests and approaches. Second, it discusses their ability to strike a careful balance between maintaining one’s position and employing flexibility and pragmatism to achieve the ultimate objective of victory over the enemy. Third, the article examines the history of international negotiations during the Second World War as an illustration of the clash between and interaction of prominent political figures, notably emphasizing how Joseph Stalin often outplayed his counterparts in this personalized “diplomacy of leaders.” The history of the Second World War eloquently shows that diplomacy is crucial both in times of war and in the transition to peace, as well as in the establishment of a new global order.