The present article examines the issue of the concept of “space debris,” which is widely used in discussions on international “space” platforms: what the term – introduced into international circulation in the 1970–1990s – means from the point of view of the norms of international space law when discussing the problem of contamination it creates in near-Earth space. The material used for the study includes treaties of international space law; the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; resolutions of the UN General Assembly; reports of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as well as of its Legal and Scientific and Technical subcommittees, and statements of certain delegations at their sessions; works of Russian and foreign scientists; the materials of international entities, in particular the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee; and U.S. regulations. The author conducts a comparative analysis of normative and other documents of these entities, as well as some provisions of international treaties (taking into account their conceptual and terminological content, and vocabulary used) using the general scientific method of cognition.The current heightened interest in the issue of space debris removal has revealed the need to clarify the international legal basis for the emergence and use of this concept for further possible practical and international legal actions aimed at solving problems associated with this. The lack of uniformity in the use of terms and word combinations for the issues under study is noted. The definitions of “space debris” that have developed without due regard to the applicable norms of international space law are considered. And regulatory explanations of the status of documents adopted in this area by various international entities and organizations are given. Assessing the current state of near-Earth space contamination, it can be noted that the issue of the active removal of “space debris” should be addressed with consideration to ensuring safe access to space, which is an integral part of the triune problem of space traffic management, the regulation of which is becoming a pressing issue and requires the development of a generally accepted legally binding international treaty.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by China marked a new phase in the country’s external openness and growing desire to influence regional and global processes. However, the BRI should not be viewed solely as a Chinese blueprint for restructuring Eurasia. The broad interpretative and geographical scope set by the Chinese authorities allows for flexibility in adapting the initiative to specific regions and countries, which is strategic for modifying or withdrawing commitments as needed. This paper examines why BRI has not become the foundation for a Chinese concept of Eurasia despite its significant impact on regional geopolitics.

Our analysis begins with a critical examination of President Xi Jinping’s speech at Nazarbayev University in 2013, where we identify the nuanced usage of “Eurasia” that primarily refers to the post-Soviet space, rather than the entire Eurasian continent. We delve into the subsequent official documents, noting the delay and ambiguity in defining the geographical and conceptual boundaries of the BRI. The 2015 document “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” illustrates the extensive yet vague geographical scope of the initiative, which suggests that China did not initially aim for a broad Eurasian strategy.

By employing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), we uncover how China’s official rhetoric strategically frames the BRI. Our analysis reveals that Chinese discourse emphasizes bilateral rather than multilateral engagements within Eurasia, reflecting a “point-topoint” rather than a networked approach. This strategic ambiguity allows China to navigate its relationships with key regional players, notably Russia and the Central Asian states, without committing to a comprehensive Eurasian integration framework. The findings highlight the cautious and adaptive nature of China’s engagement with Eurasia. The shift from a regional to a global scope in BRI discourse underscores China’s pragmatic approach in balancing its regional ambitions with global aspirations. 

It is no understatement to say that the “rules-based international order” doctrine, as opposed to the “international order based on law,” emerged as one of the most debated concepts in global politics during in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This concept presents a framework where general rules of conduct for states, though not jus cogens under general international law, are considered legally binding for all states and other participants in international relations. Consequently, it challenges the traditionally recognized supremacy of international law in governing these relations, seeking to erode established practices of international law making. This doctrine is actively used by leading Western powers to justify their political positions and accuse strategic competitors of refusing to adhere to these “rules,” which they have deemed legally binding. Understanding the essence and origin of this doctrine is crucial in unravelling its significance.

The 18th century was in many ways a transformative era for the Russian Empire, characterized by substantial internal reforms and notable foreign policy achievements. Amidst sweeping modernization efforts, Russia secured significant victories on the international stage. Under Peter I, Russia “opened a window” to Europe, while Catherine II’s reign expanded the country’s geopolitical reach to the Black Sea, facilitating access to fertile southern territories and establishing crucial maritime routes for international trade. These strategic advancements enhanced Russia’s influence and strategic capacities considerably.

During Catherine II’s reign, Russia also made its first forays into North Africa, a region previously beyond the Empire’s strategic horizon. Before gaining access to the Black and Mediterranean Seas, Russia had virtually no contact with the countries of North Africa. However, the geopolitical landscape of Catherine’s era made interaction with Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Tripoli a possibility.

This article investigates the main foreign policy initiatives of Russia in North Africa during the latter half of the 18th century. These efforts served as ancillary operations to Russia’s overarching conflict with the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the Russo–Turkish Wars, Russia exploited separatist movements within the Ottoman periphery to weaken its adversary strategically. In times of peace, Russian priorities shifted to safeguarding merchant vessels in the Mediterranean from attacks by Barbary corsairs – specifically from Tunisia, Algeria, and Tripoli. To mitigate these threats, Russia exerted diplomatic pressure on the Sublime Porte and sought to negotiate peace agreements with North African states. Nevertheless, these early Russian engagements in North Africa were tentative and often marked by limited success and instances of diplomatic adventurism, leaving several initiatives unrealized.

Utilizing archival documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI) and the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), this article provides a detailed examination of Russia’s diplomatic decision-making and negotiations with North African states. While prior Russian and foreign scholarship has analysed specific events and countries in this context, this study seeks to offer a more holistic understanding of Russia’s foreign policy objectives and actions in North Africa during the 18th century.

In the 1920s, visits by foreign delegations to the USSR served as a crucial yet challenging avenue for showcasing the achievements of the nascent Soviet state. Drawing on previously unexplored materials from the Russian State Archive of SocioPolitical History (F. 537, inv. 2), this article examines the strategies employed in hosting these guests. It explores the planning of their itineraries and leisure activities, aiming to understand how Soviet sports leaders during the early stages of state formation skilfully concealed various shortcomings (especially economic and infrastructural) and highlighted sports and cultural triumphs to craft a positive global image of the USSR through what was ostensibly a non-political institution.

Soviet physical education leaders did not shy away from inviting foreign teams to the country. Quite the opposite, they actively welcomed all interested parties who could manage the journey. An ideally orchestrated visit seamlessly integrated four key elements: sports (the competitions); culture (theatre, cinema, sightseeing); daily life (direct interaction with Soviet workers); and team recreation. When executed well, these visits garnered positive international feedback, thereby enhancing the USSR’s global prestige as the inaugural socialist state. This became the primary objective of Soviet sports diplomacy in the late 1920s, marking a significant stride in breaking through international isolation.

However, these visits were not without their limitations and challenges. The level of indoctrination varied significantly among delegations: while European proletarians often visited sites significant to the October Revolution, guests from the East were predominantly exposed to the cultural life of the country. Despite the encouragement of the Red Sport International, delegations rarely ventured beyond the major urban centresof Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, and Odessa, as provincial visits were not feasible. Furthermore, even in these key cities, visitors encountered organizational challenges: transportation costs; inadequate economic support; and problems with food provision, which diminished the effectiveness of propaganda efforts. These shortcomings were largely attributable to the absence of a standardized protocol for receiving foreign guests during the first decade of Soviet sports diplomacy and the general uneven infrastructural development of the country.