The Bottleneck Effect in EU–Russia Trade Relations
https://doi.org/10.24833/RJWPLN-2025-1-28-42
Abstract
Under what conditions can the sanctions potential inherent in EU–Russia economic interdependence be regarded as exhausted? This article examines the exemptions and derogations contained in Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 and develops a five-part typology: humanitarian and diplomatic derogations, grandfathering provisions for winding down pre-existing transactions, relief available to natural persons, and exemptions motivated by economic-security considerations. For the last of these categories, the study analyses Eurostat trade data for 2021–2023, calculates growth rates for Russian exports to the European Union, and applies the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index to measure the geographical concentration of those exports within the Union. The findings identify empirically observable limits to the weaponisation of economic interdependence in EU–Russia relations. The article conceptualises these constraints as a bottleneck effect: sanctions policy-making stalls not because restrictive measures are intrinsically ineffective or legally impossible, but because selected areas of exchange remain governed more by market than by political logic. Three manifestations of the effect are identified: first, where other EU policy priorities outweigh the objective of weakening Russia; second, where humanitarian considerations preclude outright sanctions and thereby shift coercive pressure towards tariff instruments; and third, where major member states seek to preserve entrenched trade and economic ties with Russia that were consolidated over decades of interdependence and are difficult to dismantle under prevailing market conditions.
About the Author
S. B. Davranova
HSE University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Sabina B. Davranova - PhD Student, Analyst, Center for Mediterranean Studies
17, M. Ordynka St., Moscow, 101000
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For citations:
Davranova S.B. The Bottleneck Effect in EU–Russia Trade Relations. Russian Journal of World Politics and Law of Nations. 2025;4(1):28-42. https://doi.org/10.24833/RJWPLN-2025-1-28-42
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