This article aims to identify the conceptual landscape occupied by ideas of post-war multipolarity within the strategic discourse of Soviet diplomacy during the latter phases of the Second World War. Particular emphasis is placed on the intellectual contributions of two prominent Soviet diplomats, Maxim Litvinov and Ivan Maisky. In the paper, the author draws upon both published and archival source materials including the diaries and records maintained by officials within the Soviet Foreign Office, as well as documents produced by the “Litvinov Commission.”

While the diplomatic theories formulated by Litvinov and Maisky during the years 1943–1945 have been subject to analysis by Russian and international scholars, existing scholarship has for the most part focused on the content and nuances of their perspectives on specific international “questions.” Departing from this convention, this article adopts a methodological approach that seeks to explore the underlying conceptual foundations upon which the ideas of Litvinov and Maisky were constructed. Additionally, the essay introduces a novel dimension by surveying the viewpoints of other Soviet diplomats (Solomon Lozovsky, Boris Shtein, Yakov Surits, and Yevgeny Tarle), who have garnered relatively less scholarly attention.

The author pays special attention to the nature of Litvinov and Maisky’s conceptualization of the international landscape following the war as a multipolar system, although the term “multipolarity” is not explicitly used. The article addresses such issues as how the Soviet diplomats envisioned the post-war security architecture, whether they considered Soviet-American bipolarity inevitable, and what factors and circumstances influenced their foreign policy conceptualizations. The resurgence today of discussions surrounding the trajectory of multipolarity in the 21stcentury underscores the pertinence of this historical inquiry.

The key conclusion of the article is that the conceptual framework embraced by Soviet diplomats in 1943–1945 was not centred on notions of bipolarity or an imminent Cold War. While acknowledging the potential escalation of tensions between the USSR and Western nations led by the United States and Great Britain, they favoured collaboration among the principal powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, grounded in an implicit understanding of their respective “spheres of influence.” Although Soviet Foreign Office officials did not discount the possibility of the formation of a united Anglo-American front against the USSR, they believed that Soviet diplomacy should actively work to prevent such an outcome by capitalizing on the fissures between Washington and London.