

Anti-Soft Power in Political Theory and Practice¹

Alexey V. Fenenko

Lomonosov Moscow State University

Abstract. The article deals with the study of the anti-soft power. The concept of soft power has taken over modern political discourse. The opportunities to counteract such power have not been considered properly so far. The proponents of the liberal paradigm, trapped in the ideology of its exclusiveness, have failed to study this issue. Thus, the present article aims to answer the question of whether there exists an anti-soft power, both as ideology and practice, which could be sufficiently effective for the state to protect itself from the impact of external informational and cultural influence. The theory of soft power is based on the idea that its object accepts normative subordination. Consequently, such an object should not pursue major political ambitions, should be ready to collaborate within the established world order and, above all, agree with superiority of the world leaders and the rules they impose. Anti-soft power is different. The core idea is that its holder is not willing to comply with the opponent's superiority or its rules of the game. The subject of anti-soft power is politically ambitious and never recognizes its dependence or inferiority. Regardless of being strong or weak, it will not admit its junior or secondary position in a community. A few such subjects emerged during the era of globalization. However, the globalization crisis may change the situation and thus give rise to a new political trend, the resurgence of anti-soft power. This article states that anti-soft power has repeatedly blocked the attempts of one country to influence another country. In the course of history, we can single out three main types of policy: 1) the policy based on supremacism, or chauvinism; 2) the policy based on ideological alternatives; 3) the policy based on segment restrictions of the opponent's soft power. Each of these, though, can bring its subjects both political benefits and unwanted costs.

Keywords: soft power; anti-soft power; cultural policy; ideology; propaganda; counter-propaganda; liberalism.

The concept of “soft power” occupies a central place in modern political science discourse (Alekseeva, 2016: 5–21). The list of academic works on this issue is so extensive that it already requires reference reviews (Kosachev, 2013: 11–18; Lobanova, 2017: 77–88). At the same time, the possibility of countering this type of

¹ English translation from the Russian text: Fenenko A.V. 2020. Anti-myagkaya sila v politicheskoy teorii i praktike. *Mezhdunarodnye processy [International Trends]*. 18(1). P. 40–71. DOI 10.17994/IT.2020.18.160.3

impact remains poorly understood thus far. This leaves a number of questions unanswered: Does anti-soft power even exist as an ideology and a kind of political strategy designed to protect the state from the impact of foreign soft power? Under what conditions is it desirable? What are its distinguishing features?

The existence of such a gap in modern research is understandable. A proper study of anti-soft power requires that political correctness be abandoned and a number of uncomfortable but unavoidable research questions be asked. Political scientists study how soft power can be used to influence political subjects, leaving aside the question of how the object of influence can be protected. When studying the “sword” (and this is precisely what soft power is today), the problem of understanding the “shield” (which anti-soft power should theoretically become) arises. In the present article, the author attempts to present theoretical justifications for the concept of anti-soft power, determine its content and demonstrate models of its implementation in practical politics. In the process of the analysis, “anti-soft power” will be considered solely as a scientific concept, independently of any political or ideological preferences of the researcher.

1

Despite the wide variety of works on the theory of soft power, three stages in the interpretation of this phenomenon can be distinguished.

The first stage is the emergence of the very idea that the state is able to achieve its strategic goals through ideological and cultural means. It was first proposed at the beginning of the 20th century by British political scientist Norman Angell (1872–1967). In his *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage*, which appeared shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, Angell pointed out that, as scientific and technological progress develops, inter-state wars become increasingly destructive and do not justify the financial resources spent on them (Angell, 1910). According to Angell, it would be far more effective for countries to use economic ties and attractive ideologies to pursue their interests. The ability of a state to present an attractive example can win other societies over to its side and ensure a political presence without enemy occupation.

The theory of “cultural hegemony” put forward by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) continues Angell’s thinking. He argued that the power of the ruling class rests not only on violence, but also on consent: the mechanism of power is made up of both coercion and persuasion. Hegemony presupposes active consent, in which the people desire what the ruling class demands: “governance with the consent of the governed.” Gramsci identified the technology for the formation of cultural hegemony based on three main groups: 1) “organic intellectuals” (practitioners of the ideology) who form the intellectual climate in society; 2) the traditional intelligentsia, consisting of hired intellectual workers who are in the service of the ruling class; and 3) mass media and the education system, which determine the intellectual mood of society (Gramsci, 1959: 460–462).

The second stage, which began in the early 1990s, was marked by the development of a systemic understanding of soft power. This was studied by American political scientist Joseph Nye, who suggests that soft power should be understood as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004: 3). In the structure of the foreign policy of the great powers, he singles out three tools: coercion, payments and attraction (soft power). This definition has become entrenched in political science and is now generally accepted as a given. Granted, in a 2006 letter to *Foreign Policy* magazine (Nye, 2006), he pointed out that in other countries (primarily Russia and China), soft power is interpreted as propaganda, which is not true. Soft power, according to Nye, is the ability of the state to please by example.

In this respect, the etymology of the concept of “soft power” is extremely important. In US legislation, law is divided into two components: “hard” and “soft.” The first component encompasses actions that are binding, while the second covers actions that are rights, which, if not followed, do not entail legal consequences. That is, “soft” law refers to ethical norms that are inherent in a given society, which are in theory protected with the help of public opinion. Soft power does not have punitive sanctions for insubordination, but it does create a situation where the moral imperative cannot be ignored. In this interpretation, the concept of “soft power” is somewhat equivalent to the terms “humanitarian power” or “attractive power” in Russian.

When the “classical” (i.e., Joseph Nye’s) understanding of soft power reigned in the early 2000s, its main structural components were identified in the American scientific literature:

- Economic component: the investment and financial attractiveness of the state;
- Humanitarian component: the attractiveness of the country’s education system and its scientific and technological activities;
- Cultural component: international recognition of the country’s cultural heritage; the expansion of intercultural communications; popularization of the national language; tourist attractiveness;
- Political component: the development of political institutes of democracy; human rights protection;
- Diplomatic component: the effectiveness of the negotiation process; the ability to prevent aggression and neutralize threats (Holik, 2011: 223–254).

The mechanisms for implementing soft power were economic, public and cultural diplomacy. Their purpose was not merely to create an attractive image of the country in the eyes of the population and establishment of another state. Far greater importance was afforded to enmeshing the elites of other countries in a net of interconnected relations, swaying them adopt foreign economic norms and models (Cooper, Hocking, Maley, 2008). Public diplomacy was imbued with new content, becoming a mechanism for creating a positive image of the country in the eyes of the public of another state while at the same time influencing its elites (Leonard, 2002). This process was made all the easier by the emergence of satellite television, and then satellite internet – for the first time in history, countries were able to broadcast their opinions and,

accordingly, influence foreign audiences. The policy of information influence integrated two elements: technology (regulation of the process of developing the components of the information environment) and content (the priorities of the communication activities of participants in the socio-political process).

The third stage in the understanding of soft power started in the early 2010s, when the term started to refer to a set of manipulative technologies designed to destroy a given society. In Russia, this interpretation gained traction following the publication on February 27, 2012 of an article by Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin entitled “Russia and the Changing World.”² In the article, Putin pointed to the danger that the use of soft power by external actors could pose. “The notion of ‘soft power’ is being used increasingly often. This implies a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence. Regrettably, these methods are being used all too frequently to develop and provoke extremist, separatist and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries,” Putin wrote. This approach to understanding soft power spawned a series of works that see it as a system of interfering in the domestic politics of other states (Burlinova, 2014: 28–35; Pashin, 2014: 14–21).

A similar revision of the understanding of soft power took place in the West. Back in 2004, the British historian Niall Ferguson noted the connection of soft power with imperialism (Ferguson, 2004). “Soft power,” according to his definition, is “merely the velvet glove concealing an iron hand” (Ferguson, 2004: 24). In 2017, American political scientists Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig of the National Endowment for Democracy coined the term “sharp power” (Walker; Ludwig, 2017: 6–94) to mean a foreign policy activity involving the use of tools to manipulate public opinion in other countries and undermine their political systems. According to Walker and Ludwig, this term can only be applied to authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the authors made it abundantly clear they were talking about Russia and China, and “sharp power” refers to the influence that these two states exert on democratic countries in order to undermine their political systems, mislead their people restrict the freedom of speech, and conceal or divert attention from negative information about their own countries abroad. The definition of sharp power is politically naive. The authors seemed genuinely surprised that other major players could use soft power against the United States itself, although the ideological struggle is an integral part of world history.

That said, there is an important political phenomenon hiding behind this seeming naivety: the concept of soft power in its modern understanding is a product of American political culture. The United States had not come up against an adversary

² Putin V.V. 2012. Russia and the Changing World. *Moskovskie Novosti*. 17 February. Available at: <http://www.mn.ru/politics/78738> (accessed: 15.01.2020).

who rejected US ideals outright and was unwilling to accept, let alone discuss, the attractiveness of the United States. The soft power policy of the United States was carried out in a favourable environment, being directed against countries which:

- found themselves under direct military and political control (Germany, Italy and Japan following the Second World War);
- saw the United States as a defender of their security (the countries of Western Europe during the Cold War, and the countries of Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union);
- had groups of elites that were sympathetic to the culture and ideology of the United States (the Soviet Union in the later stages of its existence, the post-Soviet countries).

This last group of targets of US influence deserves special attention. American observers typically present the collapse of the “socialist community” and the Soviet Union as a triumph of American attractiveness.³ This interpretation ignores the fact that the Soviet Union was not an existential adversary of the United States, denying it the right to exist. The musings of V. Pechatnov, a Russian expert on American studies, are to point here: “It is telling that, in Soviet times, the official Soviet propaganda did not try to sow hatred for the American people, separating them from ‘US reactionary circles’” (Pechatnov, 2006: 51). Even during the peak crises of the Cold War, the Soviet people did not demonstrate the kind of militarism towards or morbid hatred of the American public that was characteristic of how the people of Europe viewed each other before the First World War. Remarkably, not a single film was made in the Soviet Union about a victory over the NATO countries in a hypothetical “Third World War” (no “One Hundred Hours to the Rhine” or “Parade in Brussels”) like the pre-War films *First Strike* and *Heroes of the Sea*.

During the Cold War, Soviet ideology was presented as a competition between two political systems, rather than a struggle between the Soviet and American peoples. At the same time, the concept of “competition” means mutual recognition of the enemy as an equal who offers something positive that can be adopted and improved upon. Soviet society (primarily the intelligentsia and liberal groups of the party elite) was fascinated by American culture and way of life. Soviet think tanks introduced American literature to Soviet readers under the guise of “criticism of bourgeois concepts,” rather than writing about the superiority of the Soviet people and/or the inferiority of the American people. The intelligentsia tuned into foreign radio stations and felt no hatred towards the United States while listening to negative opinions about

³ Figes O. 2002. Who Lost the Soviet Union? *The New York Times*. 20 January. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/books/who-lost-the-soviet-union.html> (accessed: 17.01.2020); Laiiy K. 2014. Crimea-Happy Russians want Gorbachev to Pay for Loss of Soviet Empire. *Washington Post*. 10 April. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/crimea-happy-russians-want-gorbachev-to-pay-for-loss-of-soviet-empire/2014/04/10/ffa0f545-8923-4acd-a016-4a25a937b32a_story.html (accessed: 17.01.2020).

their country. More interesting still were the attitudes in the late Soviet Union towards American cultural products: conservatives fought to ban them, while liberals tried to get their hands on them in somewhat shady ways, but neither was overcome with hatred upon seeing them.

The manner in which the question of the ideological impact of Western countries on Soviet society is framed is also interesting. *First*, it is not clear why US ideological propaganda did not work on Germany and Japan during the Second World War. Occupation of these countries was thus necessary if the consciousness of their peoples was to be “recoded” (at least on the surface). *Second*, the framing of the question of ideological sabotage assumes that the targets of soft power are willing to listen to what outsiders have to say. Experience shows that the only way this kind of propaganda can achieve its goals is if the people of the target country are ready (1) to listen to the opponent; (2) to be self-critical and accept criticism from the outside; and (3) have a culture of national and personal self-irony. If they are not, then soft power will not work.

Russian political commentator A. Baikov pointed to the reciprocity of the soft power policy. If “hard power” is the most commonly used instrument of influence and a resource of state policy or the most prominent business structures (acting as conductors of state interests), then “soft power” is a “function” of society, a factor and a prism of its perception in the world (Baikov, 2014: 38). But perception is a subjective, not an objective, category. The projection of soft power requires a peaceful society that is ready to accept that another country may be superior to it. If, for example, we are dealing with a people who believe that their “blood is the purest,” or that the rights of their country are above those of others, then they will never accept the possibility that another nation could be superior in any aspect.

It can be argued that these conditions are absent in the interpretation of soft power proposed by Joseph Nye as the ability to “get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” But this is not the case. All three definitions of the theory of soft power are built into the general concept of “cultural hegemony” and are based on the following postulates:

1. *Axiological.* The theory of soft power suggests that the target population will be interested in the narrative you are selling about your achievements and will try to adopt a positive opinion about your country. In reality, people may react very differently to this narrative, and not necessarily positively – from the desire to protect their citizens from contacts with the country trying to exercise soft power to a surge in envious hatred for a successful opponent. That said, it is almost impossible that the targets of soft power will not assimilate at least some of the culture of the country practicing soft power tactics.

2. *Systemic.* The target of soft power should want to adopt the achievements of a more successful state, and not be destroyed by force – for example, in order to take away its wealth or increase its status in the system of international relations. Soft power can be used more effectively against an adversary who values the existing world order, but not against a revisionist power.

3. *Normative.* The target of soft power must accept the proposed rules of the game. The set of measures proposed by Joseph Nye illustrates this thesis. Hard power assumes that the opponent does not have a similar stick it can use in response. Bribery means that the adversary is willing to take payments as an alternative to ways to destroy the bribing country. The only way the country practicing soft power tactics can be considered attractive is if the target population is ready to acknowledge that country's superiority, rather than denying it unconditionally. Non-acceptance renders the three methods of imposing soft power meaningless.

4. *Typological.* Societies that project soft power and those that assimilate it are of the same ideological type. They must share common values, be relatively peaceful, focused on a high-level consumption for citizens and, most importantly, be ready to interact with other countries in the existing world order and not focused on destroying it. The American side was able to influence Soviet intellectuals during the Brezhnev era by claiming that "the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan illegally." The same was impossible with the German and Japanese population before the Second World War, and the Americans would have been greeted with a response in the vein of "And it's a good thing we did. And your worthless country will be next if you keep trying to judge." Soft power projection is impossible if the target country does not share at least some of the same values.

The totality of these methodological axioms is what constitutes the understanding of soft power that has developed in American political science. What it boils down to is not direct propaganda, but the ability of a country to please by example, to entangle the elites of other countries with a network of connections, and, if necessary, to influence and direct processes between the elites, up to support for regime change. Nevertheless, the use of soft power is only possible when and where the object of influence is ready to accept it, or is at least indifferent towards it. When the elites are initially hostile to the target of their soft power, or consider it lower culturally, then soft power itself ceases to be ineffective. This conclusion suggests that it is possible to oppose soft power, and, consequently, that it is possible to build a kind of anti-soft power. *If soft power is the ability to please by example, then anti-soft power is the ability of the state to make an opponent "unattractive," "disliked" and, in some cases, "unacceptable" in the eyes of society.*

2

International relations scholars and social sciences scholars study different things. The former are interested in the interaction of international political actors and the complex of connections between them. The latter, on the other hand, study these subjects themselves and the internal political processes taking place in them, including those aimed at shaping their foreign policy strategies. Despite the similarity of terms, the concept of "power" in the domestic political and socio-political context as presented in the classic works of Talcott Parsons and Max Weber (Parsons, 1951; Weber, 1978) is not suitable for an analysis of inter-state relations.

The traditional understanding of power would make sense in the study of international relations if the world was a single empire, or if it was a closed hierarchical system like in medieval Europe. Since we continue to live in a competitive environment of nation states, the concept of soft power as presented by international relations experts, following in the vein of Hans Morgenthau, continues to see power as the ability to convert resources (power, economic, cultural and organizational) into international political influence. Soft power in international relations is the ability of countries to mobilize cultural, informational and organizational resources within the system of interaction between states.

The terminology of anti-soft power should close the gap in the Nye's concept of soft power. In Nye's understanding, soft power acts as a variant of "normative power," or the ability of a state to produce certain socio-cultural and political norms and popularize them using normative methods and tools. Accordingly, anti-soft power can be defined as the ability of a target country to reject the rules of the game that have been dictated to it and/or oppose them with its own alternative. Anti-soft power is the ultimate variant of soft power, based on the ability of the target country to reject foreign norms.

Soft power and anti-soft power are structured differently. Soft power has four components:

- a subject: the state that produces and transmits its norms;
- an object: the state to which the subject's norms are addressed;
- a strategy: a comprehensive plan on the part of the subject for the use of soft power, or the spontaneous use of such power (for example, on the basis of the remnants of the attractiveness of the subject formed in the past);
- tools: a set of technologies and practices that the subject uses to project its soft power onto the object.

The structure of anti-soft power is different. It has the following components:

- a subject: a state that uses a strategy of warding off the soft power of another country;
- an object: the population of the subject and its partners that need protecting from the influence of an opponent;
- a strategy: goal-setting for the use of anti-soft power at home and abroad;
- tools: a set of technologies and practices that are used to fight the opponent.

The subject fields of soft power and anti-soft power are also different. Both of these categories belong to the sphere of cultural confrontation, in the broadest sense of the term. However, while the subject field of soft power mostly includes the means of projecting a country's image outside, the goal of anti-soft power is to block this from happening, while at the same time increasing the attractiveness of the country's image for its own people. Satellite television stations transmitting news abroad belong, for example, to the sphere of soft power, while systems to counteract them in other countries belong to the sphere of anti-soft power.

Anti-soft power, as a set of measures aimed at combating the ideological influence of the enemy, is not the same as counter-propaganda (Pocheptsov, 2003: 239). The task of counter-propaganda is to discredit enemy idea, destroy unwanted information entities, and prevent them from coming up in the future. The goal of anti-soft power is to cultivate the ability of society to reject (or at least not accept) such information. In other words, it aims to create a socio-political discourse within which propaganda is almost impossible. According to the Russian researcher V. Gatov, “counter-propaganda almost always seeks to split the emerging large audiences of a given propagandistic idea, to reveal and exploit contradictions in it” (Gatov, 2015). Anti-soft power is the instilling in society the ability to not absorb the discourses offered by another society.

Let us use some examples to illustrate the difference between counter-propaganda and anti-soft power. Defensive counter-propaganda uses the technique of “contrasting propaganda” – the selection of information in such a way as to create the desired effect. This is done at the level of ideas and topics covered in the media. However, it is only possible in a society that shares certain basic values with the side that is carrying out the propaganda campaign. It makes no sense to try and scare voters with an “arms race” in a society that sees war as the norm. Similarly, there is no point frightening a society hell-bent on expansion with the threat of a commodity shortage. Vladimir Lenin once wrote about the “communist conceit,”⁴ which suggests that Russia lacked a tradition of military feudalism in which such conceit of the historically paramilitary elite would be perceived as the norm.

Similarly, offensive counter-propaganda uses the technique of “imitation disinformation,” which involves altering the enemy’s propaganda, taking it in a different direction, imbuing it with different content, undermining its credibility and creating a negative image. This is only required if society is at least partly ready to listen to what the opponent has to say. If the prevailing attitude among the population towards the opposite side is that it is an enemy (in the sense that “it doesn’t matter what they say, we won’t believe them anyway”), then this technique is redundant. While counter-propaganda is aimed at dealing with specific problems at a specific time, anti-soft power is designed to form an ideological discourse in society that makes it immune to propaganda. In the same vein, the concept of “anti-soft” power is not identical to the idea of “resilience to stress” currently being developed in the European Union.⁵ The term has thus far been poorly elucidated. *First*, “resilience to stress” does not mean blocking external influence: a country’s political system can be extremely stable even if such influence exists. (Protectorates could exist for centuries, for example, but this did not stop them from being dependent on external influences.) *Second*, the concept of “resil-

⁴ Lenin V.I. The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments. In V.I. Lenin. Collected Works. V. 44. P. 173. Available at: <http://leninvi.com/t44/p173> (accessed: 19.01.2020).

⁵ *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*. European Union. Brussels. 2003. 12 December. Available at: <http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-securitystrategy-secureeurope-better-world> (accessed: 19.01.2020).

ience to stress” raises the question of what exactly we mean by “stress.” Traditionally, it refers to wars and revolutions. But wars can strengthen the political system and ensure its stability, which was precisely the case with the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453), or the modern wars in the Middle East. Revolutions do not always lead to the collapse of the political system. For example, all the European revolutions of 1848 brought was a change of the ruling dynasty in France. Anti-soft power as the ability to not be affected by external influence can both cause “stress” and succeed without it.

It would be more useful to compare the anti-soft power methodology with the theory of “political culture.” Back in 1956, the American political scientist Gabriel Almond suggested that “every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action,” which he defined as the “political culture” (Almond, 1956: 396–397). He also stressed that the term “ideology” should be understood solely as “the systematic and explicit formulation of a general orientation to politics,” while “more vague and implicit orientations” were encompassed by political culture. Later, Almond, following in the tradition of Talcott Parsons, would single out three types of orientation within the framework of political culture: cognitive, affective and evaluative (Almond and Verba, 1963). In other words, soft power is a theory of increasing the attractiveness of one’s own political culture and, accordingly, weakening the political cultures of other countries. Anti-soft power is the theory of blocking the attractiveness and even rejecting opposing political cultures.

In 1971, political culture critic Carole Pateman drew attention to the premise on which the theory rests: patterns of participation and the culture that underpins them “are not subject to substantial change” (Pateman, 1971: 292, 296). Pateman saw this as a weakness in the theory of political culture. From the point of view of the modern understanding of soft power, a stronger and fundamentally stable political culture is superior to a more flexible and unstable political culture. For example, American soft power spreads without any reflection on the right of the United States to exercise a leading role in the world, as only the policies of individual presidents are criticized. Accordingly, anti-soft power is a set of measures to increase the stability of one’s own political culture and its ability to not accept the values and norms of other political cultures. Whether or not this policy is successful is another question.

The subject cannot project its anti-soft power directly onto the opponent: the first task is to ensure that one’s own society has been fully exposed to the anti-soft power tactics; only then can the subject go on the counter-offensive. Additionally, anti-soft power is not something that can emerge spontaneously: it involves a previously planned set of measures to counter the soft power of the enemy. It is not merely about rejecting the opponent’s ideology; it is about offering an attractive alternative and possessing the technical means of spreading an information and cultural policy. *Such a policy can achieve its goals if it is based on a targeted strategy of countering the enemy’s soft power, which includes a set of specific measures that are more effective than external influence.*

3

In his work *The Age of the Crowd*, the French sociologist Serge Moscovici attempted to model a society that is impervious to propaganda (Moscovici, 1998). The results shocked even him, and he was unable to paint a picture of such a society. A society that is completely impervious to foreign soft power should demonstrate the following characteristics:

- a vision of itself as the centre of the universe and look upon other societies with a sense of conceited superiority;
- a belief that war is a normal and completely natural state of affairs;
- a feeling of envy and hatred towards more successful nations, rather than seeing them as a model to be followed;
- a developed culture of revenge and exaltation of one's grievances;
- an inability to accept criticism from foreigners, seeing this as an unacceptable act of hostility.

According to Moscovici, the perfect opposition to soft power is chauvinism. The name of this ideology comes from the name of the somewhat legendary Napoleonic soldier Nicolas Chauvin, who became a symbol of extreme forms of patriotism. Chauvinism is an ideology of national superiority as a way to justify the right to discriminate against other peoples. Chauvinism differs from simple nationalism, as it goes beyond rejecting the rights of other peoples to rejecting those peoples as such: it proclaims obligatory hatred for their culture, customs, way of life and worldview. At the level of practical politics, chauvinism is expressed in suspicion of one's own government if it enters into a dialogue with a hostile country, and distrust of fellow countrymen who have personal contacts with people from another state. At least two cases of the implementation of the chauvinistic version of anti-soft power can be identified within the last three centuries.

The first one is *Imperial Japan*. In the middle of the 16th century, the Japanese authorities established maritime trade with Portugal and Spain and happily allowed Christian missionaries into the country. However, in 1603, representatives of the Tokugawa clan, who did not look kindly upon foreigners and started to pursue a policy of isolation (*Sakoku*) took over the title of *shogun*. This involved introducing a ban on practicing non-Japanese faiths and requiring citizens to obtain government permission to leave the country (under pain of death). In 1614, the country officially banned Christianity (again, under pain of death), and from 1636, foreigners (the Portuguese, and later the Dutch) were only allowed to reside on the artificial island of Dejima in Nagasaki harbour. The new foreign trade regime implemented in 1641 banned all foreign ships from entering the roadstead of Nagasaki Port, with the exception of Chinese and Dutch vessels, which were permitted to enter only twice a year.

The ideological basis of the *Sakoku* policy was the self-perception of Japanese society. The worldview cultivated by the Japanese state was based on the synthesis of religious teachings – Shintoism, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. The latter appeared in Japan in the 8th century as a version of Faxian's teachings, with its charac-

teristic Confucianist etatism, an ideology based on the cult of the state and the power of the emperor (*Mikado*). The rationale for the Mikado's right to the throne as a descended of the sun goddess Amaterasu was laid down in the Shinto trilogy *Kojiki*, *Ni Hongi*, and *Kujiki* (Eliseeff and Eliseeff, 1974). The Japanese were then declared *kami* (deities), with each clan having its own divine progenitor. This concept was brought up to date by the historian Tokugawa Mitsukuni (1628–1700), who established a research institute in order to write his *Dai Nihonshi* (“The History of Great Japan”), which he presented to the Shogun in 1720. Mitsukuni's ideology laid the foundations for state nationalism (*teikoshuge*) based on the slogan *sonnō jōi* (“Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians!”) (Krupyanko, Areshidze, 2010: 193).

Foreigners (*gaijin*) did not fit into the Shinto system, and they were thus initially afforded a low position in the Japanese worldview. In the early 19th century, Japanese scholar Hirata Atsutane described the Dutch as having dog eyes, saying that they wore heels because they did not have heels on their feet, and that they were lustful like dogs.⁶ The Japanese press was astonished by the fact that foreigners did not eat rice, but rather meat, which made them wild and aggressive. Their attitudes to other peoples appeared in printmaking around 1840 in the work “Types of Foreigners: Russians, Ryukyuan, Dutch, Koreans and Chinese.”⁷ Here, the artist presented a condescending image of the type of people that existed outside Japan. In the 1850s, when the Western powers had forced unfair treaties upon Japan, the attitude towards foreigners was expressed by the image of the “White Monkey at the Jasper Gate” (Gila-Novickaya, 1990: 6).

Any foreigner who spoke Japanese and was interested in the local culture was called a “henna gaijin” – a strange foreigner. According to the Japanese worldview, foreigners were unable to understand Japanese culture as inherently loftier, while the Japanese were perfectly capable of studying and understanding foreign cultures. The highest honour for a foreigner in Edo Japan (1603–1867) was for them to be portrayed as Japanese. Such an honour was accorded, for example, to the American Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry and the Russian Admiral Yevfimiy Putyatin, who visited the country on military missions in 1853–1855.

The forced opening of Japan by Western powers in the 1850s created a kind of hatred of foreigners among the population (Sims, 2001). Russian traveller F. Kupchinskij noted: “it seems that they were happy to throw off European clothes and manners (...) They like to reminisce about the good old days in games, masquerades, parades, and festivals, where they rid themselves of everything that is superficial and alien to them, and only a wildly cheerful crowd of Asians remains. Then they start using slang – they talk rapidly, loudly, in stilted phrases, and sing old songs about the exploits of Samurai warriors. And these crowds have no love for Europeans. When they come across a Eu-

⁶ Rodin S. A Brief History of Love and Hate for Europeans. Arzamas. Available at: <https://arzamas.academy/materials/723> (accessed: 20.01.2020).

⁷ This work is currently stored at Harvard Art Museums.

ropean in the streets, they greet them with wild cries, laughter, and abuse. These kinds of festivities are unsafe for a European passing by if tact, endurance and composure are not in his character” (Kupchinskij, 1911: 62). The German researcher K. Ratgen noted that immediately after Japan had been opened for the rest of the world, the Japanese people demanded the expulsion of all foreigners, who enjoyed the patronage of the Mikado (Ratgen, 1903: 12).

The Japanese ideology differed from the ideological heritage of the Russian Slavophiles of the 19th century in terms of its cult of war and foreign expansion. This worldview went back to the Bushido code – a set of rules for the conduct of warriors (*The Bushido Code* 2008). The book contains a number of illustrative passages: “True courage consists in living when it is right to live, and dying when it is right to die”; “In war, the loyalty of the Samurai is manifested in facing the enemy’s arrows and spears without fear, sacrificing life if duty requires it”; “If in war a Samurai loses a fight and must lay down his life, he should say his name proudly and without a moment’s hesitation die with a smile on his face”; “The Samurai must always be cognizant of the fact that he could die at any moment, and when that moment comes, the Samurai must die with honour. That is his primary duty.” While the Samurai class had disappeared by 1877, its moral code continued to be regarded as a model to be followed.

This worldview rejects weakness. Emperor Meiji’s decree of 1871 ordering all officials to dress in European clothes rather than a kimono was a watershed moment in this respect (Meshcheryakova, 2009: 246–265). The reasoning behind the decree was that Japanese dress was associated with weakness. The Mikado himself led by example in official portraits commissioned in 1873 and 1888, in which he is wearing a full-dress uniform.

The evolution of ideas in Japanese society about China is also telling. Until the middle of the 19th century, most Japanese literature was written in Chinese. Meanwhile, in 1882, the hugely influential Japanese thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote during a visit to Hong Kong that he was immensely envious of the British and that he was delighted with their oppression of the Chinese there. In 1899, the prominent journalist Takayama Chogyū, claimed: “We admire Anglo-Saxon imperialism and we hope our imperialism does not differ from theirs” (Kitahara, 1989). China had lost its allure and was now seen as a weak power that had not survived the Opium Wars. Accordingly, Chinese culture did not offer anything of any value.

This mindset provided Japan with powerful anti-soft power. During the Meiji era (1868–1912), the imperial government used public sentiment to develop a unique ideology. The country launched a policy of Westernization, borrowing Western achievements and adopting its political system. These events were designed to increase Japan’s military-technical resources, including for the purpose of territorial expansion. The assimilation of Western (primarily Anglo-Saxon) cultural heritage was cut short by the deep faith of the Japanese people in the superiority of their country (Vasilieva, 2002:

49–63). The ultimate goal of assimilating foreign achievements was the ostensible creation of military potential capable of defeating European powers in the future, or at the very least of undermining their positions in the Pacific.

The Japanese public education system was used to transmit this ideology to the masses on the basis of the Imperial Rescript on Education dated October 30, 1890, which was read every day in schools across the country:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education (...) should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places.⁸

Another version of anti-soft power was implemented in *Imperial Germany*. Unlike in the case of Japan, this was not the result of a traditional worldview, but was rather constructed by state policy. Romantic philosophy at the turn of the 19th century developed ideas about German culture as a special civilization that opposed the French “enlightenment.” “Germany did for the ideology of conservatism what France had done for the Enlightenment – used it to its logical end,” the German sociologist Karl Mannheim wrote (Mannheim, 1994: 578). The German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte posited that the surrounding world is constructed by the will of the subject (Fichte, 1993: 2–641), while Georg Hegel went as far as to claim that it is only in the world that the “absolute idea” knows itself (Hegel, 1993: 571). During the revolution of 1848, the Austrian thinkers Karl Ludwig von Bruck and Lorenz von Stein developed the concept of “Middle Europe” (Mittel Europa), which appealed to the experience of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation during its heyday (from the 10th to the 13th centuries, when its ruler was considered the leading monarch of Europe (Kann, 1980: 88–96).

The German Empire created in 1871 started to transform these sentiments into state ideology. A favourable political background for this was created by the swift victories of Prussia in three wars (with Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870), which engendered a heightened sense of patriotism in the country and a belief in the army. In was against this background that the government of Otto von Bismarck (1862–1890) developed a state education system based on German nationalism. The most important component of the curriculum was the so-called Kulturkampf (“the

⁸ Imperial Rescript on Education. 1890. Available at: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Imperial_Rescript_on_Education (accessed: 20.01.2020).

struggle for culture”) – a policy of establishing state control over the Roman Catholic Church. The imperial government abolished the Roman Catholic bureau in the Prussian Ministry of Culture, deprived priests of the right to speak on political topics, banned the activities of the Jesuit Order and severed diplomatic relations with the Holy See. In 1873, the Reichstag passed the “May Laws,” which established state control over schools, appointments to church positions, and relations between the clergy and parishioners. In 1875, civil marriage was made compulsory in Germany. Kulturkampf paved the way for the school system to be taken under state control, and for the Catholic Church to be removed from it as a force that preached cosmopolitan values.

To combat cosmopolitanism, the concept of Pan-Germanism was introduced as an ideology that called for turning Germany into a “great space” by annexing all German-speaking territories (Chickering, 1984). As a political movement, Pan-Germanism appeared in Austria-Hungary in the early 1880s. In the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy, people started calling for separating the German lands from Hungary and joining the German Empire. By the late 19th century, many *Vereins* (associations) were operating in the provinces, as well as in Vienna. In 1886, Anton Langgassner founded the Germanenbund in Salzburg. In 1890, the Pan-German Union (the All-German Union from 1894) was established in Frankfurt am Main, with retired Chancellor Otto von Bismarck being made an honorary member. The declared goals of the movement were the revival of patriotism in Germany, support for German interests abroad, the promotion of a proactive German policy and colonial expansion.

At the same time, the ideology of Pan-Germanism was highly aestheticized. The German leadership immediately saw the potential of composer Richard Wagner (1813–1883). The first Wagner festival was held in 1876 under the auspices of King Ludwig II of Bavaria (1864–1886) in a specially built theatre in the city of Bayreuth (Bavaria), which hosted the premiere of the complete cycle of *The Ring of the Nibelung* (Buchner, 2013). The next Bayreuth (Wagner) festival in 1882 featured the premiere of Wagner’s opera *Parsifal*. The festival would go on to be held annually or biannually until 1936 (with a break in 1914–1924) (Akopyan, 2010: 52). It would later become an official event in the Third Reich. The composer’s daughter-in-law, Winifred Wagner (1897–1980), who would become a member of the Nazi Party and a personal friend of Hitler, was instrumental in this. *Not only were Wagner’s musical and mystical works turned into state ideology, but they were also used to represent Germany’s past.*

Built in 1886 by King Ludwig II of Bavaria near the town of Füssen in southwestern Bavaria, Neuschwanstein Castle would become a symbol of German anti-soft power (Neuschwanstein – “New Swan Cliff”). The wall paintings illustrate motifs from the medieval legend of Parsifal, which served as inspiration for Wagner’s opera of the same name (Petzet, Bunz, 1995: 46–123). The interior of the castle is inspired by other works by Wagner and ancient German legends. The castle hosted special Wagner concerts in the Third Reich from 1933 (the 50th anniversary of Wagner’s death) until the outbreak of war in 1939.

Another trend in the aestheticization of Pan-Germanism was the cult of antiquity. Towards the end of the 19th century, a wave of *Ariosophy* – para-scientific theories about the “Aryan race” and the search for the mystical “ancestral home of the Aryans” – swept across Europe century under the influence of Richard Wagner and the English Germanophile philosopher Houston Stewart Chamberlain (Goodrick, Clarke, 1985). In Germany, these ideas were superimposed onto the colossal development of the study of antiquity. The German historian Jakob Fallmerayer (1790–1861) posited the idea that modern Greeks are Hellenized Slavs who have nothing to do with the ancient Hellenes. This idea became popular in German historical science: “Not only did the northern part (of the Balkans – *author*) become entirely Slavic, but invading Slavic hordes also settled in Greece. They were not so numerous as to destroy (...) the descendants of the ancient Hellenes and create a Slavic Greece, but a strong admixture of Slavic blood is fully proven” (*History of Humankind...* 1896: 47–49). The German historian Ferdinand Gregorovius (1821–1891) was even harsher in his assessment: “In view of such evidence from the Byzantines, the glorification of the ancient Greek lands should be taken as a historical fact” (Gregorovius, 1900: 54–55). German historians developed the concept that the ancient Hellenes were a special extinct ethnic group related to the Germans. According to them, the “Northern peoples” created, as they claim, almost ideal “Aryan states” in the Balkans: Achaean Greece, Sparta, Thebes, and the empire of Alexander the Great (Strohm, 1997).

The privatization of antiquity made it possible to solve an important political problem. The Hapsburgs were the heirs of the Holy Roman Empire. Prussia united the German lands, which had up until that point not been the centre of empire-building.⁹ *Ariosophy* allowed scholars to connect German history not only with the “civilization of the Goths,” but also with that of Ancient Greece (including the Mycenaean culture of the 2nd millennium BC), and Ancient India. The German Empire was thus legitimized thanks to the efforts to artificially extend its history by some 4000 years. From the point of view of anti-soft power, this was a master stroke: it got rid of Germany’s inferiority complex next to other leading powers (the British, Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires) and even endowed the country with a superiority complex.

The nationalization of the cult of antiquity took place in Germany in 1886, when the engineer and archaeologist Carl Humann brought the Pergamon Altar almost in its entirety to Berlin from the Ottoman Empire (present-day Turkey). The anniversary exhibition of the Academy of Arts in Berlin held in May–June 1886 featured archaeological achievements from Olympia and Pergamon (Vickers, 1985: 516–519). On display was a full-scale model of the western façade of the base of the Pergamon Altar with copies of selected fragments of the frieze, including the images of Zeus and Athena. The exhibition also featured a model of the city of Pergamon as it looked in the

⁹ It is no coincidence that all the German states are called *Länder* (“land”), while only Austria carries the name *Reich* (“empire”) – Österreich.

2nd century BC. The frescoes of the Pergamon altar depicting the victory of the Gods of Olympus in their battle with the Titans fit perfectly into the spirit of the German Empire, with its ideology of intolerance for weakness. The building of the Pergamon Museum, build between 1912 and 1930 according to plans by Alfred Messel, is a giant copy of the façade of the original.

Later, in the Third Reich, the visual cult of ancient images became the basis of mass propaganda. The opening scene of *Olympia*, a film about the 1936 Berlin Olympics, depicts a statue of an ancient Greek athlete slowly reanimating into a German sportsman. The architect Wilhelm Kreis chose the Pergamon Altar as a prototype for the Soldiers Hall in the building of the High Command of the Ground Forces in Berlin, as well as for the planned monument to fallen soldiers at the foot of Mount Olympus in Greece. The official sculptors of the Third Reich, Josef Thorak and Arno Breker, produced statues of ideal men and women according to the “Pergamon Model” (“The Judgement of Paris,” “The Decathlete” and “Hercules and Iole”).

The cult of Ancient Greece became an integral feature of German state education from the mid-1870s. Children were taught about the natural superiority of the Hellenes over the barbarians and the cults of strength and genius (the superiority of the barbarians in terms of material resources is inconsequential here). The Trojan War (13th century BC) and the Greco–Persian Wars (5th century BC) were presented as symbols of the superiority of the Aryan spirit over other civilizations. This worldview was close to the German strategic culture formed at the beginning of the 19th century by military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Von Clausewitz was the one who posited that war was an “act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will,” that is, as a triumph of the will of the subject (the “I”) over the objective world (the “non-I”). “Military genius (...) implies a peculiar bent of the intelligent powers, therefore it can only rarely be found where the mental powers of a people are called into requisition and trained in many different ways. The fewer the employments followed by a Nation, the more that of arms predominates, so much the more prevalent will military genius also be found,” Von Clausewitz wrote.¹⁰ According to this theory, a country with scant resources could, given the right strategy (i.e., an outstanding military leader), defeat a country with a sizable military budget, population and economy

Pan-Germanism and Ariosophy reprogrammed the German ideological discourse from social opposition to the idea of “empire-building” – the notion that the German people had yet to create their own empire. The German intelligentsia, unlike their Russian counterparts, did not have a widely accepted concept of progress at the time. This layer of society saw the world as a set of discrete cultures, each with its own path and its own perception of time (Allenov, 2003). The German school of geopolitics, whose appearance is associated with the works of Heinrich Rückert and Paul de Lagarde in

¹⁰ Clausewitz C. 1934. *On War*. Gosvoenizdat. Available at: <http://militera.lib.ru/science/clausewitz/01.html> (accessed: 20.01.2020).

the middle of the 19th century, sees history as the permanent struggle of states for territories, resources and status. The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who had achieved cult-like status by the turn of the 20th century, revived the concept, popular in Eastern philosophy, of the “eternal return” – that humanity is doomed to repeat the same situations in a kind of circle. The well-known German historian Oswald Spengler developed this idea: “Mankind,’ however, has no aim, no idea, no plan, any more than the family of butterflies or orchids. ‘Mankind’ is a zoological expression, or an empty word.” (Spengler, 1993: 151). However, if only the national exists in this world, then cultures cannot be compared. German thought of the time, unlike that in Russia, denied the West (Great Britain and France) the right to be the standard of progress. Rather, it was seen as a nuisance to the ascent of German culture, a nuisance that needs to be eliminated.

There was also a liberal tradition in Germany (especially the Rhineland), but it was crushed by the Prussian intellectual discourse. The main criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of the state was its ability to win wars. This intellectual atmosphere made German society less vulnerable to foreign propaganda. Such propaganda could indeed have worked on Soviet intellectuals of the Brezhnev era, convincing them that the standard of living (and level of political freedom) was higher in the West. The German intelligentsia of the early 20th century was built differently. “The world,” wrote Arthur Moeller van den Bruck in 1906, “belongs to the hero, not the merchant.” In 1915, Max Scheler published *The Genius of War and the German War*. “We are God’s people. As the German bird, the eagle, soars higher than any earthly creature, so the German has the right to feel himself superior to all the peoples around him and look at them from an infinite height...” wrote Werner Sombart.: “Militarism is the manifestation of German heroism. It is Potsdam and Weimar in their highest synthesis. It is *Faust* and *Zarathustra* and Beethoven’s scores in the trenches.” These ideas were furthered by Spengler: “A people ‘in good shape’ is first and foremost an army, a deeply felt community of people capable of bearing weapons.”¹¹ The idea to divide the history of Germany into “Reichs” – the First Reich (the Holy Roman Empire of the 10th–13th centuries, the Second Reich (the rule of the Kaiser between 1871 and 1918), and the Third Reich (the Reich of the future) – was not Hitler’s, it was van den Bruck’s.

The Russian philosopher N.A. Berdyaev summed up the results of Germany’s anti-soft power policy of the time. In an article entitled “The Religion of Germanism,” Berdyaev described German society during the First World War thus: “The spirit of Teutonic pride permeated all German science and philosophy. The Germans are not content with instinctive contempt for other races and peoples, they want scientific justification for their scorn, to despise in an orderly, organized and disciplined manner (Berdyaev, 2007: 174). The American historian Barbara Tuchman echoed these words: “Pulsing with energy ambition, conscious of strength, fed upon Nietzsche and

¹¹ Quotations taken from the article: (Svasyan 1993: 106–107).

Treitschke, they felt entitled to rule, and cheated that the world did not acknowledge their title.”¹² Her opinion echoes that of the prominent German historian Ernst Nolte that the Nazis did not create a fundamentally new ideology, they simply made the elite projects of the Second Reich accessible to the masses (Nolte, 2006).

While we can argue about the accuracy of Berdyaev’s and Tuchman’s depictions of German society of that time, but it is hard to disagree with the fact that we nevertheless have a description of a culture that is impenetrable to the influence of foreign soft power. It may be overcome as the result of a war, but it cannot like something “by example.” That said, chauvinism has its limitations as anti-soft power:

- it cannot exist for a long time: its negative energy will inevitably need to be released in the form of a war;
- it cannot project its own soft power: chauvinistic culture can only engender rejection and hatred in neighbouring countries;
- “manipulative chauvinism” can be created in small and medium-sized countries through the use of information technology.

The “colour revolutions” of the early 21st century are good examples of the latter case. The main slogans used during the coups in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2014) were characterized by extreme nationalism – hostility towards national minorities and Russia. This means that, given the right technologies, the great powers can cultivate the chauvinism of small and medium-sized states, inciting it against strategic enemies. Such “manipulative chauvinism” will be the product of someone else’s soft power and can be used to its advantage.

4

Another version of anti-soft power is to create a positive ideological project as an alternative to foreign influence. The idea is to place one’s own ideology in direct opposition to foreign soft power. This is more complicated than simple chauvinism. The alternative ideological project should provide a comprehensive explanation of the present and offer a positive interpretation of the past, something along the lines of “we may be worse off now, but we’re building a new society, and the future belongs to us, not our enemies.”

The pioneer of this method of creating an alternative project as a way of protecting the state from soft power from the outside is *Great Britain*. The prolonged struggle with France in the 18th to the early 19th centuries was not only military, but also cultural and ideological in nature. The French Revolution, under the influence of the Enlightenment, invoked the standard-bearers of classical ancient culture – the republics of Athens and Rome. The Empire style of Napoleon Bonaparte was based on imitation

¹² Tuchman B. 1999. *The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914*. Moscow: AST; St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica. Available at: <http://militera.lib.ru/h/tuchman/01.html> (accessed: 21.01.2020).

of the early Roman Empire. To counter this influence, Great Britain set about creating a culture of romanticism based on the European Middle Ages. Christian ideas and national traditions were compared favourably to French rationalism. The British cult of the Middle Ages received a practical embodiment in the form of the historical novel as a literary genre, a revival of the architecture of medieval castles as a blueprint for residential houses and administrative buildings, and the concept of the English park as an abandoned romantic garden with pseudo-medieval ruins.

As a result, Great Britain became practically the only country in Europe whose elites avoided speaking the French language, and rejected the culture and ideas of the French Enlightenment. British influence then spread into mainland Europe, serving as a kind of refuge for those who were dissatisfied with French hegemony.¹³ After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the “era of romanticism” (love for British culture) swept across Europe, where it remained for half a century. The movement was characterized by (1) ideas about the inherent value of the creative individual; and (2) the cult of strong personality and the chivalrous culture of the European Middle Ages. British anti-soft power would turn into a powerful form of soft power for London, which allowed it to strengthen its influence on the elites of continental Europe.

The *American* version of anti-soft power followed a similar trajectory. The historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. proved that American political culture was based on the worldview of puritan settlers who, after the English Revolution in the middle of the 17th century, travelled overseas with the idea of building a “City upon a Hill” – a society created “from scratch” on the basis of the only true doctrine (Schlesinger, 1992: 15–40). Their successors were the “founding fathers” of the United States of the late 18th century, who positioned the country as a messianic state of freedom – the reincarnation of Ancient Rome.¹⁴ Upon taking office as president, George Washington defined America’s position thus: “The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the republican model of government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American People.” These words were echoed by Alexander Hamilton, who wrote that the American people had the opportunity “by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force” (cit. ex: (Schlesinger 1992: 26)).

This is where an important feature of the American worldview comes from, one that makes Americans less vulnerable to foreign soft power – confirmed non-historicity. “Today, for all the preservation of landmarks and the show biz of bicentennials, we

¹³ Suffice it to recall the English Garden in Munich, the Dessau-Wörlitz Garden Realm in Saxony, the parks in Gatchina and Pavlovsk near St. Petersburg, and the Vorontsovsky Park in Alupka.

¹⁴ It is, of course, no coincidence that Washington has its own Capitol Hill on which (as in Ancient Rome) its Senate sits.

have become, so far as interest and knowledge are confirmed, an essentially historyless people,” wrote Schlesinger, “businessmen agree with the elder Henry Ford that history is bunk. The young no longer study history. Academics turn their backs on history in the enthusiasm the ahistorical behavioural ‘sciences.’ As the American historical consciousness has thinned out, the messianic hope has flowed into the vacuum.” Americans believe that every step they take is unique and unparalleled in history, and that everything they do is a first-time event (Almond, 1950: 29–68). It is no coincidence that the concept of the “end of history” – the notion that a liberal civilization would eliminate all contradictions – was born in the United States.

American messianism started to creep into the international arena towards the end of the 19th century. In a message to Congress on December 6, 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt stated: “There are kinds of peace which are highly undesirable, which are in the long run as destructive as any war (...) The peace of tyrannous terror, the peace of craven weakness, the peace of injustice, all these should be shunned as we shun unrighteous war.” In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson declared “America is the only idealistic nation in the world (...) The heart of this people is pure. The heart of this people is true... It is the great idealistic force of history... I, for one, believe more profoundly than in anything else human in the destiny of the United States. I believe that she has a spiritual energy in her which no other nation can contribute to the liberation of mankind...” (cit. ex: (Schlesinger 1992: 23)).

At first glance, the idea of freedom, privatized by the Americans, would seem to have become the basis of their soft power. At the same time, it also contains anti-soft power potential as a self-protective mechanism. “Americans find it hard to understand why other countries do not want to copy the practices and institutions that have proven their superiority in the United States,” writes Russian political scientist A. Bogaturov. “The desire to ‘convert people to democracy’ against their will (in Iraq and Afghanistan) is a painful feature of the American worldview. The irony of this situation causes bewilderment or cold detachment in the United States” (Bogaturov, 2004). These sentiments were echoed, albeit in a somewhat milder form, by the British researcher Anatol Lieven: “Visitors to the US are frequently impressed by the outward show and symbols of conscious nationalism. Children are taught to salute the flag and it is flown by private individuals to demonstrate their patriotism. The word ‘American’ is used with a wealth of overtones, so that to describe oneself or a custom or institution as ‘American’ is to claim a whole set of positive values. The all-American boy has become something of a joke, but it is a character that most American parents covet for their sons” (Lieven, 2015: 23–24). *The belief of Americans that their country is “indispensable” for humankind has made the United States itself less vulnerable to foreign soft power.*

In the latter stages of its existence, the Soviet Union could not fend off US ideological influence. Initially, Soviet Russia had powerful soft power: after the creation of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919, it acted as a global left-wing alternative to the emerging Versailles–Washington order. The Charter of the Communist

International adopted at its Second Congress in the summer of 1920 defined the organization as “the party of the revolutionary uprising of the international proletariat.”¹⁵ An International Relations Department was created at the Communist International that was aimed at improving coordination of the actions of communist parties around the world – it was, in essence, an intelligence agency. Representative offices of foreign communist parties and Communist International training centres started popping up across Soviet Russia, where cadres of professional foreign revolutionaries were trained to work in their respective countries. Initially, the “Socialism in One Country” policy promoted by Stalin did not reject this strategy, quite the opposite, as it was about building an alternative to all states that existed at the time.

Soviet soft power’s strength was in its anti-colonial inclination. At the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin presented his ideas on taking advantage of the position of the Entente countries and the League of Nations on the issue of colonialization.¹⁶ In his opinion, the purpose of the Comintern was to bring the working people of all nations and countries together for a joint revolutionary struggle to overthrow capitalism. In September 1920, the Communist International organized the First Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku, where the Comintern’s Executive Chairman, Grigory Zinoviev, characterized the confrontation between Russia and Great Britain as a “nodal point” of modernity – the confrontation between the emerging world communist system (represented at this time by Soviet Russia) and the global capitalist (embodied by Great Britain). These provisions were consolidated in the “Manifesto to the Peoples of the East” adopted by the conference delegates (Sorokin, 1961). The Council of Action and Propaganda of the Peoples of the East was set up in order to implement the tasks proclaimed at the congress. The success of Soviet soft power was so great that Western countries adopted a series of laws to restrict the activities of the Communist International.

However, Moscow’s attempts to pursue a set of protective measures against American (and, more broadly, Western) soft power were during the Cold War proved unsuccessful. The information countermeasures used by the Soviet Union (which consisted mostly in restricting Western television and radio content on its territory) were implemented for the most part according to the American model. In 1960, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution “On Measures to Actively Counteract Hostile Radio Propaganda.”¹⁷ Radio receivers and tape recorders imported into the country were produced specifically for

¹⁵ Charter of the Communist International. Available at: <http://www.agitclub.ru/front/com/congress022.htm> (accessed: 22.01.2020).

¹⁶ Lenin V. *Theses on Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International*. In: V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works. V. 41. pp. 141–212. Available at: <https://leninism.su/works/80-tom-41/1211teziy-ko-ii-kongressu-kommunisticheskogo-internatsionala.html> (accessed: 22.01.2020).

¹⁷ Pyzhikov A. 2015. *How People in the USSR Heard the ‘Enemy’s Voice’ for the First Time from Across the Ocean*. Argumenty Nedeli. 24 February. Available at: <https://argumenti.ru/history/2015/02/389855> (accessed: 22.01.2020).

the Soviet Union and could only pick up Soviet HF and VHF bands. Radio waves shorter than 20–25 metres are unstable – the signal deteriorates significantly at night, especially in winter, and depends more on solar activity than on longer wavelengths.

However, experienced ham radio users could repurpose receivers to pick up other radio bands with little difficulty. But this was not the main shortcoming of these efforts. The inability of Soviet anti-soft power to counter American propaganda became painfully clear in the instructions for Radio Liberty in 1987. People working at Radio Liberty were prohibited from: (1) inciting or provoking their audience to flee from their countries to the West; (2) give facts relating to the lives of people who had defected from socialist countries in their new countries and voice information that may cause consumer sentiment among listeners; and (3) do into detail on the procedure for granting political asylum to defectors from socialist countries.¹⁸ This suggests that the issue of emigration was of interest to a large segment of society in socialist states. The West was not seen as a true enemy, an object of expansion, or even as an uninteresting place to be.

The change in the sentiments of pre- and post-war socialism was captured by the writer Vladimir Voinovich: “Long gone now are those happy days for Soviet propaganda when the masses responded to the Party’s contradictory appeals, built factories in Siberia with a will, ‘defended’ freedom in Spain, brandished flags and portraits of their leaders enthusiastically at demonstrations, went mad with happiness if they caught even a distant glimpse of Lenin, Trotsky or Stalin, fastened red ribbons to their shirts, and gave their children revolutionary names (...) Now, it is not revolutionary slogans, but names of Western firms and their products that young Soviets, and those not so young, utter with thrill in their soul. The words *Chesterfield*, *Panasonic*, *Mercedes* speak to their hearts more than *liberty*, *equality*, *fraternity*; foreign clothing is preferred not only for its quality. The price of a pair of jeans rises steeply if the rear pocket bears the name Mustang or Lee and falls steeply if it does not.”¹⁹

Interestingly, during the Cold War, the KGB required Soviet citizens travelling abroad to interact as little as possible with foreigners. This was quite different from the approach taken in the 1920s, when people were encouraged to “engage in discussions with foreigners abroad and win them!” (This is where Vladimir Mayakovsky’s famous battle cry “Read this and envy me: I am a citizen of the Soviet Union!” came from.) The first instance is characterized by passive defence, while the second is notable for its active offense. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union jammed Western radio broadcasts, just like the West (including the United States) jammed Communist International radio stations before the Second World War.

¹⁸ Hearings on Federal Government’s Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors before the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 1987. *Voice of America and Liberty: Strange Policies*. Washington, D.C. October 8. p. 6 (406).

¹⁹ Voinovich V. 2002. *The Anti-Soviet Union*. Moscow: Materik. Available at: <https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=29755&p=9> (accessed: 23.01.2020).

A low point in the development of socialist ideology came in 1956, when faith in the Soviet project started to dwindle among party members following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This was a stark contrast to the typical Soviet citizen of the early 1930s that the Soviet writer Anatoly Rybakov described in his *Children of the Arbat*: “They could argue and debate and even quarrel, but they were unshakable in their belief that it was Marxism, the ideology of their class, world revolution, the final aim of their struggle, and the Soviet state, the indestructible bastion of the international proletariat, that together gave their lives meaning (...) Their hearts swelled with pride. This was their country, the shock brigade of the world proletariat, the embodiment of the advancing world revolution (...) True, they had ration cards and denied themselves everything, but they were building a new world.”²⁰ The loss of faith in the construction of a new world allowed the United States to impose a different discourse on Soviet citizens, comparing its material successes with the achievements of the Soviet Union.

Another reason why Soviet anti-soft power was so weak was that a large number of latently anti-communist states had emerged. Socialism had taken root in those countries where it had been established independently of the influence of other states: the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Cuba and Yugoslavia. The same could not be said of the countries of Eastern Europe, where the population saw it as being imposed from the outside. In the first case, the people saw socialism as “theirs”; in the second, they saw it as “foreign.” The massive anti-Soviet demonstrations in Eastern Europe in 1956 was a clear sign for Moscow that their Warsaw pact allies could not be relied on. This prompted the Soviet Union to change tactics, making a deal of sorts with the dissenting countries: “Build your own style of socialism in return for our loyalty.” The failure of the Soviet experiment in these countries raised doubts among Soviet citizens about the prospects of the socialist project as a whole. The successes of social democracy in a number of European countries, such as Sweden, Norway and Austria, also played a role, demonstrating that it was possible to build a more successful (at least in terms of market saturation) socialist system without the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In the 1960s, the United States usurped one of the Soviet Union’s traditional projects – the struggle for the liberation of all kinds of minorities. American soft power was not so much about promoting the greatness of the United States; rather, it was about offering the youth a left-liberal ideology through commercial mass culture. As Russian art critic Alexander Genis wrote, “from the moment the external replaced the internal and the whole world started wearing jeans, communism did not have a chance” (Genis, 1994), and this is precisely what happened. But it is hard to stretch out one’s allure beyond a single occasion, for the long haul. It is more difficult to develop an anti-soft power strategy than it is to unleash soft power. The American youth project was a success because it assumed:

²⁰ Rybakov A. 1998. *Children of the Arbat*. Moscow: Terra-Knizny Club. Available at: <https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=34985&p=7> (accessed: 23.01.2020).

- a high degree of personal freedom (the lack of authority);
- limited commitment from the youth (participation is more important than victory);
- the opportunity to live a relaxed lifestyle, primarily during one's school years (the most important thing is to gain experience and skills).

The victory of American ideology over the anti-soft power of the Soviet Union was facilitated by the emancipation of Soviet society against the background of the state ideology that was discredited at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The emergence of “systemic dissidence” in the form of televised competitions for comedy troupes and clubs of “monied” youth inevitably reduced the repressive potential of a system that did not offer anything positive. In the 1930s, there was no “alternative” Soviet culture in the West: the Bolsheviks and capitalists were both of a single classical culture, dressed up in jackets and old-style dresses, listened to the same music and knew nothing of modern ideas about tolerance. But now, the idea of the “free West” had found a concrete expression in the form of “forbidden rock culture.”

In parallel with this, the Soviet films of the 1970s (such as those by directors Eldar Ryazanov and Georgiy Daneliya) created a cult of the meek and weak-minded man. The intellectual of the late Soviet period, trying to shed the traditional forms of masculinity such as military service had no problem sitting in front of the TV while his wife did the ironing and scolded him for being a lazy so-and-so. As far as the “old-school Bolsheviks” of the 1920s (as well as the “old soldiers” Erich Maria Remarque and Ernest Hemingway) were concerned, nothing could be more humiliating. The heroic protagonist of Soviet films was thrown into the distant past of the October Revolution and the Second World War. *The American left-liberal project found fertile ground in the landscape of the late Soviet Union, making US soft power extremely effective.*

To neutralize US soft power, the Soviet Union needed an alternative that could potentially be more attractive than the Western model, an admittedly difficult task. Of course, a counter-project could theoretically be found – for example, by glorifying the image of those who had taken part in localized conflicts and would defeat the progeny of mass culture from time to time. However, this would have demanded that late Soviet society have the same mobilization potential that it had boasted before it started to decline in the 1960s.

As an alternative ideological project, anti-soft power is more complicated than chauvinism. It should project positive and accessible images and not simply cultivate hatred. Otherwise, it loses its attractiveness. In addition, an alternative project should not have experienced any major failures that would lead its participants to reassess its values. It is quite possible to resist soft power through an alternative ideology. But this would in any case require an ideology with a powerful energy potential that the population is ready to accept, as well as an elite class ready to spread it. In other words, it requires the mobilization – technical and spiritual – of the people.

Hard forms of anti-soft power are not used in modern politics. Attempts to counteract soft power have moved into the realm of the partial restriction of information. There are a number of interesting examples, which, taken together, are starting to form a new type of anti-soft power – anti-soft power as a policy of cultural barriers.

France can be considered the founding father of this kind of anti-soft. The ideology of Gaullism, aimed at preserving the cultural identity of the country, involved the introduction of measures to protect the French language from foreign influence. These measures would be labelled a policy of linguistic dirigisme. On January 7, 1972, the French government adopted the law Enrichment of the French Language, which introduced terms that were to be mandatorily used in a number of industries to replace English borrowings. On December 31, 1975, President of France Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974–1981) signed a law to protect the French language from the “invasion” of English, and any other language, and therefore from foreign culture. The law guaranteed the linguistic status of the national language in commercial and certain other activities in France. Terms borrowed from other languages were not allowed to be used if there was a suitable French alternative. All signs in public places and on public transport had to be in French only, with foreign versions only permitted in cases when it was absolutely necessary. In 1977, the AGULF association was set up to oversee the implementation of the 1975 law. Later, in 1984, the Commissariat Général de la Langue Française (General Commissariat of the French Language) was tasked with tightening sanctions for violations of the 1975 law, expanding the creation of terminological systems, and kick-starting translation efforts so that the French language had the necessary means to reflect the modern world. The Toubon Law (Law No. 94-665 On the Use of the French Language dated August 4, 1994) establishing the status of French as the main official language of government documents, in the workplace, on signs and product labels, in commercial contracts, business communication and certain other areas was passed on August 4, 1994.²¹ The law was penned by the conservative Minister of Culture Jacques Toubon. The most important requirement of the legislation was that French equivalents be found for English terms, and that the latter should be used only when absolutely necessary. However, the law did not apply to the internet and electronic media, or to private and non-profit organizations.

The language legislation was supplemented by the Decree on the Enrichment of the French Language dated July 3, 1996, which established the legal framework for the activities of terminological commissions. The document is used as a guideline by the French Academy to approve new lexical standards each year, although its decisions are advisory in nature. French dictionaries are required to offer equivalents to borrowed (mostly English) terms by including the marker *rec.offic.* (“officially recommended”). Some examples: *joint-venture* – *coentreprise*; *voucher* – *bond'échange*; *camping-car* – *au-*

²¹ Loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 (dite Loi Toubon).

tocaravane. These attempts have had varying success, as French terms are often complex, multi-component words that try to convey the meaning of shorter and more convenient English concepts (compare the English *discount* to the French *rabais sur un prix*, for example).

Many French linguists are alarmed not only by the growing number of anglicisms in the French language, but also by the emergence of so-called “hybrid” (mixed) forms that combine English and French components, such as *billetopen* (an open-ended return ticket) and *surf arien* (air surfing), as well as by the emergence of a mixed language called Frenglish or Franglais (Deroy, 1980: 12). Franglais is used everywhere in France these days: in everyday conversations, on the internet, on television, in print, in music, in films, in books... It is especially popular among young people, who are closely associated with the English-speaking cultural space. All this speaks to the apparent failure of the French policy of linguistic dirigisme.

Certain elements of the linguistic dirigisme are used in *Poland*. The Law on the Polish Language dated October 7, 1999,²² states that all international agreements must be translated into the state language, that signs and information in offices and public utilities be in Polish, and that the Polish language be taught at all levels of education. The Council for the Polish Language, established under the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences, is responsible for promoting the Polish language and clarifying grammatical, spelling, punctuation and other rules. At the same time, the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Languages dated January 6, 2005,²³ confirmed the right of citizens to freely use their native (minority) language in private and public life.

Iran adopted even harsher measures than France to protect its cultural space. The need to ensure information security is a priority of the Iranian authorities, which have been locked in a confrontation with the United States, Israel and the bloc of oil monarchies led by Saudi Arabia since the early 1980s. Until the early 2010s, English was taught in most schools as a compulsory subject from the sixth grade, with four lessons a week allocated to it. The decision was later made to introduce English in the first grade of elementary school. The reform of the education system that took place in 2012 aimed to expand the teaching of foreign languages in the country. However, in 2016, Ayatollah Khamenei expressed his dissatisfaction with the growing popularity of English-language courses in Iranian kindergartens. “This does not mean that I am against learning foreign languages; what I am against is the promotion of foreign culture in our country among children and the youth through these courses.” He went on to say that, today, “Western thinkers have time and again said that instead of colo-

²² Law of the Republic of Poland on the Polish Language. 1999. 7 October. Available at: https://ruskline.ru/monitoring_smi/2012/10/19/zakon_respubliki_polsha_ot_07101999_o_polskom_yazyke (accessed: 23.01.2020).

²³ Ustawa z dnia 6 stycznia 2005 r. o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku, Sejm. Dostęp. Available at: <http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20050170141> (accessed: 23.01.2020).

nialist expansionism ... the best and the least costly way would have been inculcation of thought and culture to the younger generation of countries.”²⁴ In 2018, the Iranian authorities decided to remove English from the primary school curriculum.

In stepping up its anti-soft power, Iran relies on information and cyber warfare. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and its Islamic Culture and Communication Organization are tasked with performing propaganda and counter-propaganda functions. In September 2002, the Iranian government decided that only state-owned telecommunications companies could provide internet access services. Internet providers must offer their services through the state telecommunications network. In April 2003, the Supreme Council for Information Technology and Information Policy was established by parliamentary decision.²⁵ Its main tasks were to develop the state's information policy and prepare the concept of the formation of the information society in Iran.

In March 2012, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace was created to devise and coordinate state policy in the field of cybersecurity. The Council, led by the President of Iran, is made up of the heads of key state structures and departments – the Majles (the Islamic Consultative Assembly), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, the police, the judiciary, state television and radio communications companies, and scientific organizations. The National Cyber Security Centre was also set up as part of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace.

The cases of France and Iran are often contrasted by researchers as successful (Iranian) and unsuccessful (French) examples of anti-soft power strategies. However, three important points are often ignored. *First*, it is far easier for Tehran to protect the country's culture from “anglicisms” because the English and Farsi use different writing systems, and they are different types of languages: English is analytical, while Farsi is inflectional. *Second*, Iran rejects American leadership, while France, on the whole, does not. *Third*, it is difficult to gauge the degree of influence of “anglicisms” on modern youth culture in Iran. English retains its status as an international language, and linguistic anti-soft power can only do so much in terms of limiting its influence. The question is: How far can countries go when creating such barriers, and what segment of the cultural space will they be able to reclaim from the English-speaking field?

²⁴ Vashchenko V. 2018. Iran is Doing Now what the USSR Did in the Early 80s. *Gazeta.ru*. 11 January. Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2018/01/10/11604386.shtml?updated_ (accessed: 24.01.2020).

²⁵ Surkov V.N. 2005. The Problem of Information Security in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Institute of the Far East. 14 May. Available at: <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=3636> (accessed: 24.01.2020).

6

There are no all-encompassing anti-soft power projects in the world today. This is perhaps due to the fact that there have been no strong revisionist regimes since the late 1980s, and liberal ideology has prevailed. Under these conditions, the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) creates the potential for reviving anti-soft power projects on a qualitatively new basis.

The idea of protecting one's information space from foreign influence originated in the United States. The Radio Act of 1912 prohibited foreigners from owning American radio stations.²⁶ Another act of the same name appeared in 1927 and limited the participation of foreigners in American radio stations to 20% of the total shares and/or authorized capital.²⁷ The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 required organizations representing foreign governments in American politics and foreign individuals and entities to disclose their occupations and sources of income. The Voorhees Act of 1940 regulated the activities of organizations with links to foreign political structures, or, as the US government termed them, "organizations that are subjects of foreign influence."²⁸

The Cold War period was somewhat ambivalent in this sense. Both superpowers outwardly limited the penetration of the enemy's ideology into their respective countries. At the same time, unlike the interwar period, public opinion in both the Soviet Union and the United States did not accept the logic of a "besieged fortress." The American people responded with mass demonstrations against the McCarthyism of the 1950s, which called upon citizens to look everywhere for communist spies. In the Soviet Union, the widespread obsession with imported goods and the prestige that visits to capitalist countries carried constituted passive forms of protest. The "spy everywhere!" mentality of the 1930s no longer existed. At some point, people in both the Soviet Union and the United States started to look at the obsession with spies with a certain amount of irony – the James Bond books and films in the United States, and the songs of Vladimir Vysotsky in the Soviet Union are testament to this.

Defensive IT is significantly inferior to offensive IT at the present juncture. That said, countermeasures are gradually improving, and the ratio between soft power and anti-soft power may start to level off. The 2010s were marked by the gradual disintegration of the global information space into national segments. This will inevitably make it easier for states to control information resources. Modern technologies fill the policy of anti-soft power with new content, giving additional impetus to the four methods of successfully countering the enemy's soft power:

²⁶ An Act to Regulate Radio Communication (37 Stat. 302). Available at: <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hnfe4a&view=1up&seq=10>.

²⁷ Radio Act of 1927 (Public Law 69-632). Available at: [https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.\\$b45924&view=1up&seq=204](https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b45924&view=1up&seq=204) (accessed: 24.01.2020).

²⁸ The Foreign Agents Registration Act. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20141121095831/http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02063.htm.

1. *The creation of an informational alternative.* In this case, this means creating an alternative to American satellite television. The Qatari Al Jazeera television channel launched in 1996 was a pioneer in this area, serving as a model for Euronews in the European Union, and Russia Today and the Sputnik information system in Russia. These measures were so successful that the United States and the United Kingdom started to actively oppose their activities. Yet, the attempts to restrict the content and reach of these channels often resulted in increased viewership. Depriving the opponent of the opportunity to dominate the information space narrows one's own resources for spreading soft power.

2. *Control over segments of the internet.* Until the mid-2000s, the Americans branded this a method of "self-defence" practiced by authoritarian regimes and referred specifically to the practice of blocking a number of websites in China, central Asian countries and the Arab states. In the 2010s, Western countries started to adopt this practice themselves – suffice it to mention the legislative initiatives of the United States to combat the supposed Russian interference in its elections. The US version, however, was not about limiting information, but rather about forming and disseminating the desired picture of the world.

One very important question was ignored in the kerfuffle about Russian meddling in US elections: What is happening to American society if it can be influenced by foreign hackers? In the past, people in the United States would have been amused by the practice of creating "fake accounts," saying something like "if you don't like it, don't read it." People in an information-protected society will ignore posts that go beyond the established consensus. As the German philosopher Immanuel Kant said, "this is a property of unbelief: it will cast doubt on the very facts presented." It would seem that Kant's logic is failing in the United States. Information has become so powerful and influential that states are searching for ways to counter its spread.

3. *Reformatting discussions.* US think tanks had at one time mastered this particular technique. In the course of discussions, criticism of the opponent is permitted, but strictly in a predetermined manner (Kubyshkin and Tsvetkova, 2013). For example, it is all well and good criticizing the United States for its "excessive use of force" in Iraq, but this ignores the fundamental question of who actually gave Washington the right to use military force beyond its borders. In certain conditions, this method of reformatting the discussion can be directed against the subject of soft power itself.

One way to deliver a painful blow to the subject of soft power is to cast doubt over its moral authority. There are two ways in which its discourse is typically destroyed. The first is to raise the question of what gives them the right to act as an authority. The second is to draw the opponent into a discussion about the relativity of their moral norms in the Chekhovian logic of "no one knows the real truth." In this case, the subject of soft power will have to move from the offensive and go on the defensive. However, this would require: a) the opponent to have a powerful information weapon; b) a readiness to not accept the benefits of the subject of soft power or reformat them in its favour.

4. *Marginalizing the opponent.* Soft power is a tool for fighting wavering countries, not persuading enemies, and is therefore implemented in three stages. First, is doing everything to attract the wavering country to your side. Second is the division of enemies into moderates and radicals, with the subsequent conclusion of an agreement with the former. And third is the inevitable split of the radicals, where the example of integrating moderates into the system provokes some of those opponents who remain to also seek an agreement. It is only at the fourth stage than the marginalization of the most uncompromising opponents takes place and the preconditions for their destruction created. Accordingly, the use of anti-soft power requires blocking the enemy's soft power at the very first stage by reducing the number of undecided states.

The success of anti-soft power in the future is linked to the key issue of whether or not society can be mobilized. By "mobilization," we mean a set of measures aimed at bringing the armed forces and state institutions under martial law. Broadly speaking, mobilization is the use of military methods of management to achieve national goals. It seems somewhat outdated in today's world, with its cult of globalization and openness and its obsession with giving people all kinds of rights. But this does not mean that mobilization projects will not return, albeit on a new basis.

The potential for the former kind of mobilization was laid in the 1870s, the decade during which the leading powers abandoned their "free trade" policies in favour of protectionism through the creation of national industrial complexes. It was also during that time that almost all the great powers switched to a system of conscription. This was made possible by the technical innovations of the late 19th century – the rapid expansion of railway networks and telegraph lines, the invention of radio, and progress in aeronautics. It was these achievements that made it possible, for the first time in history, to control large masses of the population. Subsequent mobilization efforts during the First and Second world wars were the result of an ideological and technological breakthrough.

The Cold War period was a time of decline for mobilization projects. The Soviet and American people did not want a repeat of the Second World War and were not ready to accept mutual hostility and intolerance as a natural state of bilateral relations. The lack of "major wars" reduced the need for national service and made impractical to maintain overdeveloped military-industrial complexes. Symptoms of the waning concept of mobilization were the ever-spreading cult of consumerism, the numerous youth protests, the "sixties" and self-irony. People had also started to poke fun at the incessant "spy mania" in both countries.

The globalization crisis leads us to ask what will come to take its place. The trade wars, sanctions and embargoes of the 2010s led to the phasing out of the global economy in favour of national protectionism. The only way for states to achieve economic breakthroughs now is to return to the practice of internal mobilization.²⁹ Modern elec-

²⁹ If the movement of capital and goods is limited, then mobilization is the only real way to compensate for this.

tronic media can shape mass consciousness, while digital technologies make it easier to monitor people's private lives. Whether or not they can be used to solve collective problems is unknown.

By the time the 21st century rolled around, liberal democracy was facing a new challenge. The development of information technology has made it possible to manipulate public sentiment quickly and steer the course of voting in elections (Kosolapov, 2004: 10–11). Even in the United States there is talk of the danger of removing the political content from institutions that outwardly appear democratic. Mobilization against a “dangerous enemy” may allow American society to more smoothly transition to more controlled democratic processes.

It is difficult to imagine a return to a mobilized world. But it was also difficult for a well-off European of the times of Marcel Proust and Leo Tolstoy to imagine that his world had already made the move towards mobilization. Even fewer people in the 1870s could have imagined that mobilization experiments would eventually create the prerequisites for the Second World War. In the meantime, as the mobilization components increase, hostility between the United States and Russia (as well as between other states) will not weaken, on the contrary, it will grow. And this hostility will not be reminiscent of the Cold War, but of a more distant past. This hostility will not be reminiscent of the Cold War, but of a more distant past.

* * *

Anti-soft power has historically been a powerful means of blocking the influence of one country on another. The liberal paradigm made it impossible to study this phenomenon, as it was bound by the thesis that there was not alternative to liberal ideology. Meanwhile, anti-soft power as a set of techniques to counter ideological influence has been successfully implemented in political practice on more than one occasion. Three types of policies can be identified in the structure of anti-soft power: (1) anti-soft power based on chauvinism; (2) anti-soft power based on an alternative project; and (3) anti-soft power based on partial (segmental) restrictions on the informational impact the enemy is able to achieve. Each policy can bring both political dividends and political costs.

Both soft power and anti-soft power are based on the “I-concept”: the totality of the subject's ideas about themselves and their place in the world. The theory of soft power relies on the target audience's readiness to recognize its own secondary (i.e., subordinate) position. Adopting foreign norms means attaching a dependent or, more precisely, a junior position in a certain hierarchy. Soft power is also possible in relation to countries that do not have great political ambitions, are happy to interact within the framework of the existing world order and, most importantly, recognize the superiority of the side employing soft power tactics. If the audience believes itself to be superior to the country practicing soft power, then it is impossible to influence them in any significant way.

Anti-soft power is built upon different foundations. Its “I-concept” suggest that the subject is initially not prepared to recognize the superiority of the opponent and, most importantly, the rules of the game the opponent wishes to force upon them. These subjects harbour serious political ambitions, do not recognize the superiority of any norms over their own, and are not ready to accept a subordinate position. They may be strong or weak, but in any case will not be ready to be “second” or “junior” in the community. There have been very few such subjects in the period of globalization. However, the globalization crisis that we are now witnessing can make such subjects a noticeable force in inter-state relations.

About the Author:

Alexey V. Fenenko – Dr. Sci. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of International Security, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, 119991, Russia. ORCID: 0000-0003-0493-2596.
Email: afenenko@gmail.com

Conflicts of interest.

The author declares the absence of any conflicts of interest.

References:

- Akopyan L. 2010. *Muzyka XX veka: entsiklopedicheskij slovar'* [Music of the XX century: an encyclopedic dictionary]. Moscow: Praktika. 855 p. (In Russian)
- Alekseeva T. 2016. “Myagkaya sila” v teorii i praktike mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij [“Soft power” in the theory and practice of international relations]. *Politicheskoe prostranstvo i social'noe vremya. Identichnost' i povsednevnost' v strukture zhiznennogo mira. XXX Harakskij forum*. Yalta. P. 5–21. (In Russian)
- Allenov S. 2003. “Konservativnaya revolyutsiya” v Germanii 1920-kh – nachala 1930-kh godov (Problemy interpretatsii) [The “Conservative Revolution” in Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s (Problems of Interpretation)]. *Polis*. № 4. P. 94–207. <https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2003.04.09> (In Russian)
- Almond G. 1950. *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger. 269 p.
- Almond G. 1956. Comparative Political Systems. *Journal of Politics*. 18(3). P. 396–397.
- Almond G., Verba S. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 562 p.
- Angell N. 1910. *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage*. New York: G.P. Putnam's & Sons. 388 p.
- Bajkov A. 2014. “Myagkaya moshch” Evropejskogo Soyuzu v global'nom silovom ravnovesii: evro-rossijskij trek [The EU Soft Power in the Global Equilibrium]. *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*. 2014. 2(35). P. 36–46. <https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-2-35-36-46> (In Russian)
- Berdyayev N. 2007. *Sud'ba Rossii*. [The Fate of Russia]. Moscow: Eksmo. 640 p. (In Russian)
- Bogaturov A. 2004. Istoki amerikanskogo povedeniya [The sources of American conduct]. *Rossiya v global'noj politike*. 6. P. 80–97. (In Russian)
- Buchner B. 2013. *Wagners Welttheater. Die Geschichte der Bayreuther Festspiele zwischen Kunst und Politik*. [Wagner's world theatre. The history of the Bayreuth Festival between art and politics]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

- Burlinova N. 2014. Publichnaya diplomatiya Rossii: praktika i problemy stanovleniya [Russian public diplomacy: practice and problems of formation]. *Vestnik analitiki*. 57(3). P. 28–35. (In Russian)
- Chickering R. 1984. *We Men Who Feel Most German: Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914*. London: Harper Collins Publishers. 267 p.
- Cooper A., Hocking B., Maley W. (eds) 2008. *Global Governance and Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 330 p.
- Deroy L. 1980. *L'emprunt linguistique*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 485 p.
- Eliseeff V., Eliseeff D. 2006. *Yaponskaya tsivilizatsiya* [Japanese civilization]. Yekaterinburg: U-Factoria. 528 p. (In Russian)
- Ferguson N. 2004. *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*. New York: Penguin Press. 400 p.
- Fihte I. G. 1993. Sochineniya v 2-h tomah. Sankt-Peterburg.: Mifril. 1485 p. (In Russian)
- Gatov V. 2015. *Postjornalist: Zhurnalistska posle «tsifrovogo perekhoda»* [Postjornalist: Journalism after the «Digital Transition»]. Moscow: Izdat. resheniya. 299 p. (In Russian)
- Genis A. 1997. *Vavilonskaya bashnya: iskusstvo nastoyashchego vremeni: ehssse*. Nezavisimaya gazeta.
- Gila-Novickaya T. 1990. *Kul't imperatora v Yaponii: mify, istoriya, doktriny, politika*. [The cult of the Emperor in Japan: myths, history, doctrines, politics]. Moscow: Nauka. 206 p. (In Russian)
- Goodrick-Clarke N. 1985. *The Occult Roots of Nazism: The Ariosophists of Austria and Germany, 1890–1935*. Wellingborough: The Aquarian Press. 296 p.
- Gramsci A. 1959. *Izbrannye proizvedeniya. T.3 Tyuremnye tetradi*. [Selected works. Prison notebooks]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo inostrannoy literatury. 565 p. (In Russian)
- Gregorovius F. 1900. *Istoriya goroda Afin v srednie veka*. [History of the city of Athens in the Middle Ages]. Saint Petersburg. 392 p. (In Russian)
- Hegel G. 1993. *Lekcii po filosofii istorii*. [Lectures on the philosophy of history]. Sankt-Petersburg: Nauka. 350 p. (In Russian)
- Holik G. 2011. Paper Tiger? Chinese Soft power in East Asia. *Political Science Quarterly*. 126(2). P. 223–254 <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2011.tb00700.x>
- Gelmolt G. (ed.) 1896. *Istoriya chelovechestva. Vsemirnaya istoriya*. [History of mankind. World history]. V. 5. Saint Petersburg: Prosveshchenie. (In Russian)
- Kann R. 1980. *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526–1918*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 662 p.
- Kitahara M. 1989. *Children of the Sun: the Japanese and the Outside World*. Sandgate: Paul Norbury Publications. 160 p.
- Kodeks Bushido. Khagakure. Sokrytoe v listve* [Bushido Code. Hagakure. Hidden by the Leaves]. 2018. Moscow: Eksmo. 188 p. (In Russian)
- Kosachev K. 2013. Myagkaya sila i zhyostkaya sila – ne summa, no proizvedenie [Soft power and hard power are not the sum, but the product]. *Indeks Bezopasnosti*. 19(4). P. 11–18. (In Russian)
- Kosolapov N.A. 2004. Svoboda i nesvoboda v global'nom miroporyadke [Freedom and Non-Freedom in the Global Order]. *Mezhdunarodnye processy*. 2004. 2(3). P. 4–17. (In Russian)
- Krupyanko M., Areshidze L. 2010. Yaponiya: ideologiya natsionalizma [Japan: ideology of nationalism]. *Istoriya i sovremennost'*. №. 2. P. 185–215. (In Russian)
- Kubyshkin A., Cvetkova N. 2013. *Publichnaya diplomatiya SShA*. [Public diplomacy of the USA]. Moscow: Aspekt Press. 271 p. (In Russian)
- Kupchinskij F. 1911. *Novaya Yaponiya* [New Japan]. Saint-Petersburg: Posev. 264 p. (In Russian)
- Leonard M., Stead C., Smewing C. 2002. *Public Diplomacy*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.

- Liven A. 2015. *Anatomiya amerikanskogo natsionalizma*. [Anatomy of American nationalism]. Moscow: Eksmo. 512 p. (In Russian)
- Lobanova D. 2017. Kontseptual'nye podkhody k opredeleniyu ponyatiya sily v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh [Conceptual approaches to Definition of Power in IR Theory]. *Mezhdunarodnye processy*. 15(2). P. 77–88. (In Russian)
- Manheim K. 1994. *Diagnoz nashego vremeni (sbornik)* [Diagnosis of our time (Edited Volume)]. Moscow: Yurist. 700 p. (In Russian)
- Meshcheryakov A. 2009. Otkrytie Yaponii i reforma yaponskogo tela (vtoraya polovina XIX – nachalo XX vv.) [The discovery of Japan and the reform of the Japanese body (second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries)]. *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*. №. 100. P. 246–265. (In Russian)
- Moskovichi S. 1996. *Vek tolpy. Istoricheskij traktat po psikhologii mass*. [The age of crowds. Historical treatise on mass psychology]. Moscow. 478 p. (In Russian)
- Nolte E. 2006. *Die Weimarer Republik: Demokratie zwischen Lenin und Hitler*. Munchen: Herbig. 432 p.
- Nye J. 2004. *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs. 191 p.
- Nye J. 2006. Think Again: Soft Power. *Foreign Policy*.
- Parshin P. 2014. Dva ponimaniya “myagkoj sily”: Predposylki, korrelyaty i sledstviya [Two Understandings of Soft Power: Preconditions, Correlations and Consequences]. *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*. 2. P. 14–21. (In Russian)
- Parsons T. 1951. *The Social System*. New York: The Free Press. 575 p.
- Pateman C. 1971. Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change. *British Journal of Political Science*. 1(3). P. 291–305. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400009133>
- Pechatnov V. 2006. “Lyubov'-gorech” k Amerike [Bitter love for America]. *Mezhdunarodnye processy*. 4(1). P. 30–40. (In Russian)
- Petzelt M., Bunz A. 1995. *Gebaute Träume: Die Schlösser Ludwigs II. von Bayern*. Munchen: Hirmer. 305 p.
- Pochepcov G. 2003. *Informatsionno-politicheskie tekhnologii* [Information and political technologies]. Moscow: Centr. 381 p.
- Ratgen K. 1903. *Vozrozhdenie Yaponii* [The Revival Of Japan]. Saint Petersburg: A.V.Orlov press. 24 p. (In Russian)
- Shlesinger A. 1992. *Tsikly amerikanskoy istorii* [Cycles of American history]. Moscow: Progress. 688 p. (In Russian)
- Sorkin G. 1961. *Pervyy s"ezd narodov Vostoka*. [First Congress of the peoples of the East]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoy literatury. 80 p. (In Russian)
- Spengler O. 1993. *Zakat Evropy. Ocherki morfologii mirovoj istorii*. [The Decline of the West. Essays on the morphology of world history]. Moscow.: Mysl'. 672 p. (In Russian)
- Sims R. 2001. *Japanese Political History since the Meiji Revolution, 1868–2000*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 395 p.
- Strohm H. 1997. *Die Gnosis und der Nationalsozialismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 292 p.
- Stunz H. 2007. Hitler und die Gleichschaltung der Bayreuther Festspiele. *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. 55(2). P. 237–268.
- Svas'yan K. 1993. Osval'd Shpengler i ego rekviev po Zapadu [Oswald Spengler and his Requiem for the West]. In Shpengler O. *Zakat Evropy. Ocherki morfologii mirovoj istorii*. M.: Mysl'. P. 3–151. (In Russian)
- Vasil'eva V. 2002. Problemy kul'turnoj identifikatsii yaponcev v epokhu Mejdzi (1868–1912) glazami evropejtssev [Problems of cultural identification of the Japanese in the Meiji era (1868–1912) through the eyes of Europeans]. *Izvestiya Vostochnogo instituta*. № 4. P. 49–63. (In Russian)

Vickers M. 1985. The Thunderbolt of Zeus: Yet More Fragments of the Pergamon Altar in the Arundel Collection. *American Journal of Archaeology*. 89(3). P. 516–519. <https://doi.org/10.2307/504367>

Vojnovich V. 2002. *Antisovetskij Sovetskij Soyuz* [Anti-Soviet Soviet Union]. Moscow: Masterik. 209 p. (In Russian)

Walker C., Ludwig J. 2017. *Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World*. Washington D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy: International Forum for Democratic Studies. 124 p.

Weber M. 1978. *Selections in Translation*. Cambridge University Press. 410 p.